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ARE COMMERCIAL SPEECH CASES IDEOLOGICAL?
AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY
Adam M. Samaha* & Roy Germano**
ABSTRACT
The empirical study of judicial behavior continues to grow and mature. The live
challenges include specification, such as constructing useful conceptions and measures
of ideology, mapping particular domains in which identifiable forces influence deci-
sions, and quantifying the magnitudes of those influences. To make progress on these
challenges, we roll out new and expanded datasets that build on the work of Cass
Sunstein, Lee Epstein, Gregory Sisk, and others, and we report on the character of
constitutional litigation today. Our datasets cover U.S. Court of Appeals decisions in
five domains: (1) commercial speech, (2) gun rights, (3) abortion rights, (4) establish-
ment clause claims, and (5) anti-affirmative action claims. The bulk of the data reaches
into 2016. Part of the data collection was automated, but all judge votes were coded
by at least one law professor. Our vote coding allows judges to support claims in part
or in full. We then deploy three proxies for judge ideology, including a new variable
designed by Adam Bonica and Maya Sen that relies on judges’ pre-appointment cam-
paign contributions. In our regression models, we introduce both standard and novel
independent variables, such as three measures of procedural and substantive law.
Commercial speech cases are the focus of this Article. We find no evidence of
ideological influence within the full set of those cases, in the sense of judge votes
tracking ordinary policy disagreements. The results make commercial speech cases
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look like gun rights cases—and unlike abortion rights, establishment clause, and
affirmative action cases, which are consistently ideologically charged in our models.
The differing magnitudes of ideological influence across case sets are presented
numerically and visually. However, when commercial speech cases are limited to post-
2000 decisions, to cases involving disclosure requirements, or to cases involving
“right-wing advertising,” some results do change. Our variable for “big business”
claimants is statistically significant in the post-2000 cases but not in the full sample
of cases. Also, subtle ideological rifts seem to emerge in the disclosure and right-
wing advertising cases, with some judges apparently migrating toward or away from
supporting commercial speech claims in part or in full. Some of our findings are
preliminary and warrant further research. Regardless, our data and analysis should
cast more light on contemporary constitutional litigation as it now stands, after the
close of the Obama administration and at the beginning of the Trump presidency.
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I vehemently dissent.1 [abortion rights]
[Q]uit trivializing the Constitution!2 [religious establishment]
We deplore . . . the refusal of a present majority to recognize this.3
[racial integration]
I will not join the carnage.4 [meat labeling]
INTRODUCTION
Some conception of ideology, loose or tight, plays a role in adjudication. This
news is old and hedged, but the observation can now command widespread agree-
ment from informed observers. Constitutional law scholars can, with little effort, see
a loose version of judicial ideology at play in upstream decisions about the architec-
ture of legal doctrine. Among empiricists, the role of policy preferences in producing
case results is longstanding conventional wisdom, even if their concept of judicial
attitudes is not always well-defined or cleanly distinguished from lawful discretion.
In any event, the live empirical challenges today involve specifics: conceptualizing
and operationalizing ideology, identifying domains in which ideology does and does
not play a role, and estimating and comparing magnitudes across domains.5
This Article revisits several domains of constitutional decision-making with new
data and a few new angles. The Article focuses on commercial speech cases in the
federal circuit courts and compares the judge voting patterns there with those in gun
rights, abortion rights, establishment of religion, and affirmative action cases. The
datasets are either expanded from the earlier work of other scholars or built from
1 Memphis Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Sundquist, 175 F.3d 456, 468 (6th Cir. 1999)
(Keith, J., dissenting) (condemning parental consent restrictions on abortion).
2 Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Sch., 33 F.3d 679, 685 (6th Cir. 1994) (Guy, Jr., J.,
concurring) (rejecting a challenge to a religious display in a public school).
3 Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 371 (4th Cir. 2001)
(opinion of Motz & King, JJ.) (supporting, among other efforts, a magnet school program
to promote racial integration).
4 Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Brown, J.,
dissenting) (condemning country-of-origin labeling requirements for particular commodities).
5 See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, On Law’s Tiebreakers, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1661, 1710
(2010) (suggesting that extreme versions of the attitudinal model of judicial behavior, in
which law has no independent influence on case outcomes, are giving way to more complex
empirical views); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in Quantitative Studies of
Judging, 50 B.C. L. REV. 685, 688 (2009) (contending that the key issue is how much, not
whether, judicial ideology matters). An extensive review of the early scholarship that is ac-
cessible to a lawyer audience is Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 257, 272–329 (2005).
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scratch, and the bulk of the data now reaches into 2016.6 Some of the data collection
was automated using a new Westlaw scraper, but all of the judge votes have been
coded by at least one law professor. In addition, judge votes are allowed to support
the relevant claim or claims in full, in part, or not at all. This coding increases our
ability to pick up subtler shifts in voting behavior compared to binary coding.7
Furthermore, we use three measures of judicial ideology interchangeably for
purposes of comparison: the party of the appointing president, which is a standard
metric in the empirical literature on judicial behavior; Judicial Common Space scores,
which also are commonly used; and so-called DIME scores, which are recently
released measures based on judges’ campaign contributions before they take the
bench.8 Moreover, in addition to a number of fairly standard independent variables,
we constructed three new variables based on procedural and substantive law.9 Con-
structing variables like these is an effort at “bringing the law back into the study of
courts.”10
The first headline result is that judge voting on commercial speech claims writ
large looks different from—and nonideological compared to—voting in several
other case sets.11 If we define this domain of litigation simply and broadly, that is,
ideological influence seems absent when people or companies complain about
advertising regulations. None of our variables for judicial ideology are statistically
significant in either a bare-bones specification that controls only for judge traits,12
or a more complex kitchen-sink specification that attempts to measure and control
for more than a dozen additional variables such as procedural posture, doctrinal
subdomains, and several claimant traits.13 Other intriguing variables, such as
whether the commercial speech claimant is a “big business,” do not appear to have
clear effects on judge voting, although they are worth further investigation. In
commercial speech cases, a dummy variable identifying big business claimants is
not statistically significant at conventional levels in the full case set, but is for cases
6 See infra Section II.A (describing the case sets); Section III.A & Table 1.0 (reporting
summary statistics).
7 See infra Section II.B (describing dependent variables).
8 See infra note 141 and accompanying text. As explained below, we use DIME scores
with imputations. DIME scores are alternatively referred to as “CFscores” (“campaign fi-
nance scores”) in the literature.
9 See infra Section II.C (describing independent variables).
10 Charles M. Cameron & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Rational Choice Attitudinalism?, 2015
EUR. J.L. & ECON. 1, 17 (book review) (emphasis omitted); see also FRANK B. CROSS,
DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 47 (2007) (calling quantitative measures
of law “essential”).
11 See infra Section III.A.
12 See infra Section III.B.1 & Tables A.1–A.3 (reporting bare-bones model results).
13 See infra Section III.B.2 & Tables B.1–B.4 (reporting kitchen-sink model results). For
a lay understanding of our tests for statistical significance, see infra note 177.
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decided after the year 2000.14 Regardless and from a broad global perspective on the
modern era of constitutional litigation, therefore, judicial disagreements over com-
mercial speech claims do not look like judicial disagreements over, say, abortion
rights or affirmative action.
There is another headline to report, however: If we cut further into the domain
of commercial speech litigation from two theoretically defensible angles, then evi-
dence of ordinary ideological divisions emerges. Surprisingly, and whatever consti-
tutional doctrine suggests, the subset of cases involving mandatory disclosures and
warnings seems ideologically divisive.15 Perhaps more troubling, judges sometimes
divide over advertising content that is “right-wing” as opposed to “left-wing.”16 To
paraphrase Judge Higginbotham’s thirty-year-old complaint, the basis for disagree-
ment in these cases “may be little more than how judges view whiskey”17—and guns
and cigarettes and brothels. That said, some of the patterns are nuanced, with left-
leaning judges apparently attracted to supporting commercial speech claims only in
part, when the case involves disclosure or the advertising content turns rightward.
Thus for a piece, but only a piece, of the commercial speech docket we find
indications of ideological divides that match ordinary political divides outside the
judiciary. This much might be enough to prompt rethinking about the value of judi-
cial review in this space.18 Indeed it has never been clear that constitutional judicial
review in this field has been worth the price in litigation costs and policy flexibility,
or whether judges are sufficiently able to address emerging challenges such as busi-
ness or regulator leveraging of big data analytics and cognitive nudges. Either way,
the results reported below will underline the importance of choosing thoughtfully
the domain of judicial behavior to study and the metrics of valuation. These choices
can determine whether indicators of ideological influence are set off—whether
14 See infra Section III.B.3 & Table C.1 (reporting results for post-2000 commercial
speech cases). For our impressionistic coding of “bigness” in business, see text accompany-
ing note 165 infra.
15 See infra Section III.B.3; Table C.2; Figure 3.0 (all reporting results for commercial
speech cases involving a disclosure issue).
16 See infra Section III.B.3; Table C.2; Figure 3.0 (all reporting results for commercial
speech cases involving putatively right-wing advertising). For our coding of advertising
content, see text accompanying note 173 infra. In a similar spirit is Lee Epstein et al., Do
Justices Defend the Speech They Hate?: In-Group Bias, Opportunism, and the First
Amendment 2–3, 8–10 (2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2300572
[https://perma.cc/V39W-8D3Z] (reporting that the votes of putatively liberal and conserva-
tive Justices correlate with liberal and conservative speech content of the claimants, as coded
by the authors).
17 Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 755 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Higginbotham,
J., dissenting) (evaluating, reluctantly, liquor advertising restrictions).
18 See infra Section IV (identifying plausible responses to the reported results for com-
mercial speech litigation, including judicial “exit”).
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judges’ courtroom divisions over cigarette packaging and gun advertising look like
everyone else’s divisions over abortion policy and affirmative action. At a mini-
mum, we can foreground the empirical options in order to better inform our reform
commitments.
I. IDEOLOGY IN PERSPECTIVE
A. Upstream and Downstream
From conventional yet contested legal materials, someone must formulate con-
stitutional doctrine to guide decisions on categories of issues. Constitutional doctrine
provides part of the decision architecture for workaday judges, a strut located between
high-level abstract principles and ground-level results.19 We can then picture the
development of doctrinal architecture as taking place “upstream” from particular case
results, which we may locate further “downstream” in the development of consti-
tutional norms. Now, the processes of developing mid-level doctrine and generating
case results obviously occur simultaneously. Doctrinal design choices are influenced
by experience with particular controversies and, sometimes unfortunately, by the
case-level facts presented to the judge.20 The upstream and downstream labels are
metaphors, to separate conceptually two functionally related operations.21 Each
operation has a distinguishable connection to judicial ideology.
The concept of ideology has several interchangeable forms as applied to adjudi-
cation. Loosely, we may think of ideology as including a general perspective on how
the world does or should operate without reference to extrajudicial politics,22 and as
encompassing something called judicial philosophy.23 The constitutional law of
19 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION ix (2001) (high-
lighting judicial doctrine as a mechanism for implementing constitutional norms).
20 See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 885,
890–99 (2006) (examining “the disturbing possibility” that the ordinary adjudicative process
in courts skews perceptions and predictions about a rule’s distribution of applications toward
all-too-salient case facts).
21 See Adam M. Samaha, On the Problem of Legal Change, 103 GEO. L.J. 97, 111 (2014)
(investigating stability and change in antecedent processes and consequent results within
legal institutions and elsewhere).
22 See, e.g., Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We Talk About Ideology:
Judicial Politics Scholarship and Naive Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 231, 242,
249–50, 254–55 (2009) (identifying one definition of ideology that is loose enough to include
beliefs, experiences, and perceptions about the world, while later qualifications of ideology
turn more political).
23 See, e.g., Charles Fahy, The Judicial Philosophy of Mr. Justice Murphy, 60 YALE L.J.
812, 813 (1951) (“Cases were not merely vehicles for the decision of a particular con-
troversy, but occasions for the exposition of a philosophy of imaginative application of the 
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commercial speech and other fields must be “ideologically driven” in the loose sense,
and without any shame for the judges who built that law. Formal law that is not well
developed for a given issue or that affirmatively invites discretionary judgments will
allow for or demand this loose notion of judicial ideology.24 Thus, upstream doc-
trinal development is unavoidably influenced by each judge’s general judicial phi-
losophy, whether or not influenced by policy preferences that track disagreements
outside the courthouse. Yes, we might test, for example, judges’ commitments to rules
or standards, broad or narrow holdings, and rapidly as opposed to rarely updated
legal norms for correlation with ordinary political divides. But we should not have
strong expectations of a match.
More tightly, we may think of ideology as the extralegal nonjudicial policy
preferences that we see everywhere else in society. The distribution of these policy
preferences among judges might or might not mimic the distribution of such prefer-
ences in agencies or legislatures or elsewhere. This tighter conception of ideology
helps us ask whether results in court are driven by forces much different from results
in nonjudicial politics. If we have reliable measures of policy differences in society,
we can check for those differences in judicial decisions.
This target of investigation should turn our attention downstream. The down-
stream application of preexisting law to particular cases might be compared to other
policy disputes, if we can translate the options that judges face into similar choices
that other people face. Where the evidence is convincing,25 we may then connect
Bill of Rights so that individual liberties should prevail over the efforts of the community to
restrict them . . . .”); Miriam Galston, Activism and Restraint: The Evolution of Harlan Fiske
Stone’s Judicial Philosophy, 70 TUL. L. REV. 137, 185 (1995) (“[H]is preoccupation with the
growing ineffectiveness of the law and with the threat to the legal order posed by a dwindling
popular consensus as to the law’s justice pulled him further and further toward a judicial
posture deferential to legislative initiatives in economic matters.”); John W. Poulos, The
Judicial Philosophy of Roger Traynor, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1643, 1693 (1995) (describing a
balancing of “the forces of repose” against “the creative forces” of the judge creating new law).
24 See Adam M. Samaha, Looking Over a Crowd—Do More Interpretive Sources Mean
More Discretion?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 9), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=2888909 [https://perma.cc/8H4N-CMXD]. Pauline Kim helpfully explains that
some conception of ideology is sometimes built into formal law itself, and that judges may
have an “ideological” commitment to following law best understood. See Pauline T. Kim,
Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 404–08 (2007). An excellent experimental
study of judicial decision-making, with an uncharitable take on observational studies, is Dan
M. Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of Moti-
vated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349 (2016). The authors
emphatically restate the important point that doctrine sometimes allows or calls for the
application of “different judicial philosophies.” Id. at 363.
25 In LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 159, 168 (2013), the overall voting difference be-
tween Democratic and Republican appointees to the Courts of Appeals, across all case cate-
gories, is on the order of 6%. For examples of studies failing to find statistically significant
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downstream judicial results with extralegal policy preferences. And worth asking
is whether the philosophical coalitions that build and retain the constitutional law
of commercial speech will maintain a crosscutting quality, or whether judges, how-
ever unique their institutional setting, will divide the same way the rest of us divide.
B. Cross-Cutting Coalitions
For some years, the commercial speech doctrine was only mildly controversial.
At first, lawyers and judges struggled over whether commercial advertising was
within even the outer limits of the First Amendment’s speech clause and correspond-
ing protection in the Fourteenth Amendment.26 In 1942, the Supreme Court quickly
and unanimously explained that the answer is “no.”27 In 1976, the Court reversed
course and answered “yes” in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.28
Justice Blackmun’s lengthy opinion in Virginia Board observed doctrinal drift
away from the no-coverage position,29 identified settled free speech principles to
confine the legally eligible reasons for stiffing proposals to engage in commercial
correlations between standard proxies for judicial ideology and judge voting patterns, see,
for instance, Barton Beebe, Does Judicial Ideology Affect Copyright Fair Use Outcomes?:
Evidence from the Fair Use Case Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 517, 519, 522 (2008) (studying
fair use votes); Samaha, supra note 24, at 42–43 (studying likelihood of trademark confusion
findings in district courts); Nancy Staudt et al., The Ideological Component of Judging in the
Taxation Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797, 1800 (2006) (reporting no statistical associa-
tion between supposedly liberal and conservative Justices and liberal and conservative tax
case voting in general, but then an association in corporate income tax case voting); see also
E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: The
Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1578–92 (2004)
(studying securities law votes). A study that is sensitive to magnitudes is Matthew Sag et al.,
Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CALIF. L. REV.
801, 803–04 (2009) (“[A]lthough ideology is highly predictive of IP [(intellectual property)]
outcomes [in Supreme Court cases], the size of this effect is nonetheless significantly lower than
it is in cases involving prominent social issues, such as voting rights or the death penalty.”).
26 An incisive introduction to the foundational theories and doctrinal developments is
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 890–95 (2d ed. 1988).
27 At least for “purely commercial advertising” in the public streets. Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (contrasting undue regulatory burdens on information
and opinion dissemination in the streets, and stating “the Constitution imposes no such re-
straint on government as respects purely commercial advertising”). Later, Justice Douglas
called Valentine’s conclusion “casual, almost offhand. And it has not survived reflection.”
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
28 425 U.S. 748, 761–62 (1976).
29 See id. at 758–60.
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transactions,30 and made an effort to measure the interests of advertisers, consumers,
and even voters in such information, “[s]o long as we preserve a predominantly free
enterprise economy.”31 However persuasive as a matter of professional lawyering,
the opinion attracted broad support on the Court. Justice Blackmun’s opinion re-
assembled the Roe v. Wade32 supermajority coalition, plus Justice White.33 Only
Justice Rehnquist (another Nixon appointee) dissented.34 He contended that the
majority had only scored points for “desirable public policy,” which was better di-
rected to the institutions of ordinary politics.35
Much of the reasoning in Virginia Board is logical, thoughtful, and lawyerly.
It resembles some early legal scholarship on the question of how to treat informa-
tional advertising under the First Amendment.36 Martin Redish was one of the first
legal scholars to contribute, contending in 1971 that “as much information as pos-
sible concerning the relative merits of competing products” was necessary for an
individual “to achieve the maximum degree of material satisfaction permitted by his
resources.”37 Consumer decision-making in an information-rich environment was also
good practice, he argued, for other settings including democratic self-governance.38
“When the individual is presented with rational grounds for preferring one product
or brand over another, he is encouraged to consider the competing information . . .
[and to] exercise his abilities to reason and think; this aids him towards the intangi-
ble goal of rational self-fulfillment.”39
30 See id. at 761–62.
31 Id. at 765.
32 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33 See id. at 165 (attempting to formulate doctrine that, among other virtues, is “consistent
with the relative weights of the respective interests involved”). Recall that only Justices White
and Rehnquist dissented in Roe. Id. at 167, 171; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973)
(White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart wrote concurrences in Roe,
as they would later in Virginia Board. Roe, 410 U.S. at 167 (Stewart, J., concurring); Bolton,
410 U.S. at 207 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice Stevens, having been recently appointed
to the Supreme Court to replace Justice Douglas, did not participate in Virginia Board.
34 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35 Id. at 784 (“[T]here is certainly nothing in the United States Constitution which re-
quires the Virginia Legislature to hew to the teachings of Adam Smith in its legislative decisions
regulating the pharmacy profession.”).
36 Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and
the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 433 (1971).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 439.
39 Id. at 443–44; cf. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial
Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 634 (1990) (concluding that “[t]he [F]irst [A]mendment’s text
and history don’t provide us with any explanation of the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech,” and going on to evaluate the Court’s alleged commonsense dif-
ferences in “the nature” of commercial speech).
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We should wonder whether courts are better at evaluating these competing in-
terests than other combinations of actors. Institutional turns in legal scholarship
demand that much.40 Some of the above logic might seem quaint and beside the
point for the contemporary world, in which image advertising and identity-connected
consumer behavior play large roles.41 Simple product descriptions and pricing are
easily pulled down from digital sources by online consumer searches, and we do not
always see simple informational advertisements for the x product at the y price.
Furthermore, any notion that a rising information load is strictly beneficial to human
judgment is an economic theory now battered if not crushed by behavioral evi-
dence.42 To the extent that courts are able to update their approach to commercial
40 See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 4–5, 246 (1994) (arguing that having policy goals
is basically unimportant without understanding implementing institutions); ADRIAN VERMEULE,
JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 63
(2006) (calling for sophisticated institutional analysis in formulating useful interpretive
protocols for real judges acting on limited information); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group
Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 33–35 (1991) (com-
paring, in a serious theoretical way, judicial to legislative systems); Lawrence Gene Sager,
Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1212, 1263–64 (1978) (arguing that institutional constraints prevent Justices from enforcing
every aspect of the Constitution as they might understand it); Adam M. Samaha, Undue
Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 661–62 (2006) (observing that “[j]udges might be honest yet
error-prone brokers, or parochial yet expert players,” and suggesting ways to calibrate
judicial review in light of its decision costs); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886 (2003) (contending that useful
and realistic debates about legal interpretation must take into account institutional capacities
and dynamic effects); see also Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 2–4, 22 (1998) (stressing the value of empirical inquiry over normative con-
stitutional theorizing by law professors); William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2044–45 (2006) (reviewing VERMEULE, supra) (asserting that an
“institutional turn started almost a century ago” in legal scholarship and practical theorizing);
cf. Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50
DUKE L.J. 1277, 1278 (2001) (“The massive scale of the political branches relative to the
judiciary—measured in resources, personnel and organizational capacities—ensures that,
across a broad range of constitutional questions, the legislative process rather than the Court
has de jure or de facto authority to decide constitutional questions.”).
41 See Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and Social Identity, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 931, 941–42
(2010) (discussing the notable role that advertising and branding may have in our oppor-
tunities for identity formation, perhaps as old forms of religion, family, and geography become
less constraining).
42 See, e.g., Martin J. Eppler & Jeanne Mengis, The Concept of Information Overload:
A Review of Literature from Organization Science, Accounting, Marketing, MIS, and Related
Disciplines, 20 INFO. SOC’Y 325, 331, 333 & tbl. 4 (2004) (listing, among the symptoms of
information overload, “[a]rbitrary information analysis and organization” including ignoring
information, losing control over information, superficial analysis, loss of differentiation,
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speech disputes with new learning about “commercial” interactions, we have to face
John Hart Ely’s nagging suggestion—perhaps more darkly poignant in a politically
riven society—that “[t]here simply does not exist a method of moral philosophy.”43
The point probably is overstated but it remains a good warning. That said, the Justices,
if not other judges, often do have the chance “to follow the ways of the scholar,”44
if not the professional philosopher. Some people might hope for real judicial progress
on these and other constitutional disputes. There is, in any event, a roughly parallel
brand of principled lawyer’s reasoning in the Court’s opinions and in some legal
scholarship on commercial speech.
Whatever the quality of the early commercial speech opinions as philosophical
inquiries, the Court’s early efforts in the field could boast significant bipartisan and
trans-ideological support.45 When the Court invalidated flat restrictions on a utility
company’s promotional advertising and announced a four-part test for commercial
speech claims in the famous case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission,46 once again only Justice Rehnquist dissented.47 A group of
Justices did refuse to join Justice Powell’s majority opinion on the ground that he
offered insufficient protection to commercial advertising,48 or threatened to unjustifi-
ably expand the range of commercial speech doctrine at the expense of more con-
stitutionally valuable promotional exhortations.49 But this group of Justices (Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens) did not obviously share one philosophy of judging, let
alone partisan affiliation or ordinary policy preferences. They certainly were not easily
classified as the most pro-business faction on the Court. However the Justices were
overestimation of peripheral cues, and misinterpretation); Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R.
Lepper, When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 995, 1003 (2000) (reporting results of field studies indicating
that some consumers are deterred from purchasing when the option set increases); Naresh
K. Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer Decision Making, 8 J. CONSUMER RES. 419,
424, 427–28 (1982) (separating experimentally the number of options from the number of
option attributes, and finding that increasing either is associated with decreasing decisional
accuracy, measured by respondents’ own preferences, though the effects were apparently
triggered at different numerical levels); Barry Schwartz et al., Maximizing Versus Satisficing:
Happiness Is a Matter of Choice, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1178, 1179, 1193 (2002)
(examining evidence of an increasing sense of regret when consumers face large numbers of
choices, but distinguishing more-regretful maximizers from less-careful satisficers).
43 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 58 (1980).
44 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 25 (2d ed., Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962).
45 See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text.
46 See 447 U.S. 557, 563–66 (1980).
47 See id. at 583 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
48 See id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring).
49 See id. at 579 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring).
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devising four-part tests or rigid rules, there did not appear to be an easy formula for
predicting their positions based on conventional left/right divisions.
The next best illustration of crosscutting agreements might be 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island.50 All nine Justices agreed that government may not outright
prohibit price advertising for alcohol,51 and their disagreement over the proper shape
of constitutional doctrine showed nothing like the well-known cleavages in abortion,
religion, and other newsworthy topics. Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg
indicated that strict judicial review was appropriate for government attempts to
prohibit dissemination of truthful and nonmisleading commercial advertising, at
least when not related to a “fair bargaining process.”52 The regulation of commercial
advertising to eliminate false, misleading, or overly aggressive sales pitches would
be entitled to less demanding review.53 Justice Thomas wanted to go further and
make per se unconstitutional any government effort to influence market choices
through the maintenance of consumer ignorance.54 But Justice Scalia withheld judg-
ment on the correct content of the doctrine, despite his sense that the Central Hudson
test had “nothing more than policy intuition to support it.”55 The Justices who were
most friendly to regulation and most protective of Central Hudson’s abstract inter-
mediate scrutiny were Justice Breyer from the supposed left, Justice Souter and
Justice O’Connor from the supposed middle, and Chief Justice Rehnquist from the
supposed right side of the Court.56
C. Familiar Divides
This early structure of disagreement described above—with the Supreme Court
fairly receptive to complaints by commercial advertisers while offbeat coalitions
spoke up for strict or lax doctrine—might be disintegrating. Any “First Amendment
era of good feelings” might well have ended.57 The Justices certainly have divided
into camps of the usual suspects in some relatively recent cases.
50 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (plurality opinion).
51 Id. at 489.
52 Id. at 501 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
53 See id.
54 See id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring).
55 Id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring). The parties had not offered evidence on history and
long-standing tradition, and Justice Scalia apparently was not ready to conduct the necessary
research. See id.
56 See id. at 532 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Because we need go no further, I would not
here undertake the question whether the test we have employed since Central Hudson should be
displaced.”). Note some resemblance to the coalition of centrists on campaign-finance issues.
57 BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON’S MUSIC: ON READING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 113
(2015); id. at 115 (suggesting that “[a]fter 2000, Republican and Democratic justices began
to revert to type”).
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A possible forerunner was the 2001 divide in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,58
which addressed cigarette, smokeless tobacco, and cigar advertising and promo-
tion.59 This time, a more familiar group of dissenters coalesced, albeit not to demand
radical doctrinal change.60 Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter contended
that the state should be allowed to go forward and defend at trial its restriction on
tobacco advertising within 1,000 feet of schools and playgrounds.61 The first three
of these Justices also rejected the Court’s invalidation of a regulation requiring that
displays not be too low to the ground, close to eye level for children.62
Lorillard was hardly the bitterest split on the Court in that era, but there are
other instances of conventional divisions in the commercial speech field. Worth
mentioning is Thompson v. Western States Medical Center.63 The case involved re-
strictive conditions on the promotion of compounded prescription drugs if those
mixtures had not completed a rigorous premarket approval process at the Food and
Drug Administration.64 The issue produced a 5–4 divide to which we became accus-
tomed during this time frame.65 Finally, we now have the potentially monumental
decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.66 There, a 6–3 majority pushed commercial
speech doctrine into big data territory, cabining regulator power to restrain the collec-
tion and use for marketing of data collected on prescription drug practices.67 The
majority attempted to recognize new data-driven privacy questions, but thought that
the State was rigging “a debate” about privacy.68 Justice Sotomayor joined the major-
ity69 but the dissenters were Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, who charged the
majority with misjudging an ordinary regulatory effort for health and against sharp
marketing practices.70
58 533 U.S. 525 (2001). As a young associate, one of us (Samaha) helped represent Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota and the State of Minnesota in their lawsuit against the
tobacco industry and its trade associations. Part of his work involved First Amendment
objections to the suit. The views that we express here, of course, are our own and do not
necessarily reflect those of Blue Cross or the State of Minnesota.
59 Id. at 532.
60 See id. at 590, 599–603 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61 See id.
62 See id. at 604–05.
63 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
64 See id. at 368–69 (describing the statute and the federal government’s defense).
65 See id. at 389 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (raising concerns that the majority’s application
of the Central Hudson test might produce “a tragic constitutional misunderstanding” in which
courts interfere with “what ought to be a legislative or regulatory decision about the best way
to protect the health and safety of the American public”).
66 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
67 See id. at 557.
68 Id. at 579–80. The majority did stress its conclusion that the statute in question was
insufficiently broad and rigid to serve its asserted goals. See id. at 580.
69 See id. at 555.
70 See id. at 580–81, 602–03 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (expressing worries about a return
to pre–New Deal judicial aggression toward “ordinary economic regulation”); see also
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True, the number of such divided commercial speech decisions is not large.
Systematic empirical analysis probably is not worthwhile. Moreover, we can find
counterexamples of relatively unified positions. A recent case involving disclosure,
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States,71 produced fairly widespread agree-
ment among the Justices on the proper outcome.72 But the question remains how the
Justices and other judges will decide, or fracture over, future waves of bleeding-edge
controversies surrounding the boundaries of commercial speech. Judges on the federal
courts of appeals and state courts already are facing new angles on the commercial
speech field, and we should be inquiring into how they approach the upstream issues
of doctrinal construction as well as the downstream issues of application to particu-
lar controversies.
Consider, then, a number of emerging commercial speech issues on which ideol-
ogy in a loose sense seems unavoidable, and on which a narrower conception of
ideological division might also appear. For example, should judges be concentrating
on the character of the government regulation or the character of the alleged speech at
issue? Older doctrine appeared to screen out commercial speech claimants depending
on whether the content of their (proposed) advertising was false, misleading, or pro-
posed an unlawful transaction.73 But perhaps judges will at least sometimes shift their
attention to the regulation’s target, as they often do in other fields.74 Moreover, what
counts as a misleading statement, exactly, and how much discretion should adminis-
trative officials have in locating the boundaries? A contemporary D.C. Circuit
decision shows judges pondering whether a federal agency could demand two sound
empirical studies of the beneficial effects of pomegranate juice, instead of just one.75
LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE
CONSTITUTION 84 (2014) (“In an information age, as the line between economic transactions
and speech blurs, the Sorrell approach might imperil whole swaths of financial, corporate,
consumer, and medical regulation.”).
71 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010) (following Zauderer and upholding a disclosure requirement).
72 See id. at 231.
73 See Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in First Amendment Law, 98 Nw. U. L. REV.
1291, 1329–33 (2004) (describing cases and arguments, and concluding that “the filtering
question in commercial speech cases is bound to arise again”).
74 See Retail Dig. Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638, 648 (9th Cir. 2016) (re-
manding a display company’s claim against limits on alcohol wholesaler paid advertisements
and indicating tougher scrutiny for content-based regulation after Sorrell, though continuing
to refer to “laws burdening commercial speech” as the trigger for the doctrinal test). In early
work, one of us characterized this legal design choice as one between litigant-sensitive and
litigant-insensitive doctrine. See Samaha, supra note 73, at 1295–96.
75 See POM Wonderful, LLC v. FTC, 777 F.3d 478 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (upholding an FTC
finding of deceptiveness, but rejecting an FTC order to prevent misleading advertising insofar
as it required at least two randomized clinical trials for any POM claim about disease), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1839 (2016).
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Other issues will more plainly track policy rifts outside the courthouse. For
instance: Is nudging consumer decisions, such as by framing options as losses or
gains,76 sneaky and unconstitutional or not even a regulation of speech? Appellate
courts have struggled over whether prohibiting sellers from imposing surcharges on
credit card transactions while allowing cash discounts is a ghastly mind game or
instead humdrum price regulation.77 The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari.78 
When businesses try to develop an image and a cultural resonance that links up
with customers’ sense of identity, do these efforts count as commercial speech or
more highly valued expression? The Federal Circuit went en banc and divided over
the government’s ability to prohibit a punk band, The Slants, from trademarking a
potentially racially offensive name, with some judges maintaining that trademarks
are subsidies over which government retains significant discretion.79 The Supreme
Court recently granted certiorari on this matter, too.80
Finally, when regulators demand that businesses inform the world at large about
their operations, as opposed to particular product details, is the government improp-
erly compelling private actors to deliver offensive messages, or legitimately facilitat-
ing reflective consumer choice in an age of collapsing boundaries between economic,
private, and ethical aspects of life? Lower courts are now debating the boundaries
of the government’s power to demand disclosure regarding the origins of products—
where they came from and how they were made—beyond information about the x
product, narrowly defined, at the y price.81
76 See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (exploring the malleability of individuals’
choices based on changes in presentation).
77 Compare Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 807 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir.
2015) (“Florida’s no-surcharge law directly targets speech to indirectly affect commercial
behavior.”), with Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 131 (2d Cir.
2015) (“Because all that [the statute] prohibits is a specific relationship between two prices,
it does not regulate speech.”), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
78 See Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 30.
79 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (finding the
statute’s disparagement provision unconstitutional), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137
S. Ct. 30 (2016); id. at 1363, 1368 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (denying
that the statutory provision is facially unconstitutional as to all purely commercial speech,
and asserting “[t]hat trademark registration is a subsidy is not open to doubt”).
80 See Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 30.
81 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (invali-
dating, over a partial dissent, an SEC rule requiring certain companies to state on their websites
that their products were not “DRC [Democratic Republic of Congo] conflict free”); Am.
Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 20, 22–23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (upholding,
over a dissent, country-of-origin labeling and recognizing disclosure interests beyond decep-
tion when mandating factual information), overruling R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA,
696 F.3d 1205, 1214, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (invalidating, over a dissent, an FDA rule issued
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Upstream development of constitutional doctrine invites the use of judicial
philosophy, and careful empirical study is not needed to know this. But little work
has been done to test whether downstream disagreements over commercial speech
at the case-result level track nonjudicial policy divides. No one will be surprised to
see that a significant degree of judicial disagreement over abortion policy and af-
firmative action programs matches our proxies for judicial ideology.82 But judicial
divides in nominally commercial fields might not be as easily predicted or under-
stood. The New Deal shift at the Court supposedly established a settlement in which
most economic policy would be de-constitutionalized,83 and so we might not expect
to find many areas of constitutional litigation with a clear commercial facet to com-
pare or learn from.
Pioneering work by Cass Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa Ellman, and Andres
Sawicki included commercial speech cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals within an
impressive number of controversial litigation fields.84 The authors reported that
Republican appointees were about six percent more likely to support challenges to
commercial speech regulations than Democratic appointees from 1978 through
2004.85 But the authors noted that this difference did not meet conventional stan-
dards for statistical significance,86 and comparisons with their other case sets suggest
that commercial speech cases were on the low end of ordinary ideological divisive-
ness.87 More recently, John Coates suggested that corporate speakers are making
progress in the federal judiciary on their constitutional claims, and perhaps displacing
people as the beneficiaries of free speech litigation.88 The study is provocative but
did not focus on commercial speech, per se, and did not code deeply into appellate
court cases.89
pursuant to a federal statute requiring cigarette packages to include color graphic images de-
picting negative health consequences of smoking); see also Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs,
622 F.3d 628, 632 (6th Cir. 2010) (invalidating much of an Ohio rule restricting dairy producer
claims about non-use of hormones, including a disclosure requirement involving placement).
82 See infra Sections III.B.1–2 (reporting regression results).
83 See Jamal Greene, What the New Deal Settled, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 265, 280 (2012)
(summarizing conventional wisdom on the New Deal settlement for the domains of deferential
as opposed to more-intense judicial review).
84 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006).
85 See id. at 39.
86 See id. at 165 n.56 (reporting p = 0.13).
87 See id. at 26–27 fig. 2-2.
88 See John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data, and
Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223 (2015).
89 See id. at 249 (reporting that “cases currently in the Courts of Appeal under Central
Hudson predominantly do not involve expressive businesses, but are attacks on laws and 
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Judges on those intermediate courts are thought to show lower levels of ideologi-
cal division compared to the Supreme Court, in the downstream sense of case results
tending to match preference divisions in wider society.90 Their mix of cases is dis-
tinctive, often routine but also covering the hardest of the hard cases. In any event
much law is developed, auditioned, and even effectively finalized at this intermediate
level. Furthermore, the mix of cases within a given circuit is generally subject to ran-
dom assignment across judges within the circuit.91 “Related cases” are an exception,92
but many empirical studies of judicial behavior take advantage of the largely random
assignment practice of the U.S. Courts of Appeals in the modern era.
What can we learn, then, from more data?
II. DATA AND METHODS
A. Case Sets
For this Article, we analyzed votes cast by U.S. Court of Appeals judges on
claims involving commercial speech, the right to keep and bear arms, abortion
rights, establishment of religion, and affirmative action challenges. Some of the data
were collected earlier and made available by Cass Sunstein and his team (commer-
cial speech claims);93 the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence (gun rights claims);94
Greg Sisk and Michael Heise (establishment clause claims);95 and Lee Epstein,
regulations that inhibit ‘speech’ by other kinds of businesses in areas of activity incidental
or instrumental to their core profit-making activity”).
90 See, e.g., EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 168.
91 See Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1,
47 (2009). The development and features of case assignment systems are not as well
understood as one might hope. See id. (“There seems to be no general historical account of
randomization’s rise in case assignment protocols . . . .”).
92 See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the
Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1039 (2000) (offering an example in one circuit).
93 See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 84, at 160–61 n.17; see also Cass R. Sunstein et al.,
Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L.
REV. 301 (2004). The Sunstein dataset on commercial speech cases goes back to 1978 and
ends in 2004. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 84, at 160–61 n.17. We thank Andres Sawicki
for making the data available to us.
94 This database of gun rights decisions, in state and federal courts since Heller, is pro-
prietary but was generously shared with the authors by the organization. 
95 See Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”? An Empirical
Study of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201
(2012). The Sisk and Heise data on establishment clause cases ends in 2005. Their dataset
is available at EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY DECISIONS, http://courseweb.st
thomas.edu/gcsisk/religion.study.data/cover.html [https://perma.cc/XN9D-52W4].
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Richard Posner, and William Landes (anti-affirmative action claims).96 All of the
preexisting case coding was reviewed by Samaha and corrections were made.97
Samaha constructed the abortion rights case set from scratch.
The new and enlarged case sets have several useful features. First, recent cases
were added to bring the data forward through June 2016,98 and therefore the data
now include votes by judges appointed by President Obama. Second, judge votes
were coded to allow support for a claim or claims either in full or only in part. Third,
to reduce human error and to increase the speed of data collection, some of the
coding was automated. Many of the case names, citations, opinion dates, judgments,
and names of the panel members were scraped from Westlaw using an application
written by Luke Samaha.99
The case selection criteria for these preexisting datasets is not always clear,
which is not surprising for the lawyer’s task of collecting relevant cases. Relevance,
if at all sophisticated, depends on some judgment calls. We replicated as best we
could the earlier criteria. We also made efforts to keep a record of cases that were
collected in initial Westlaw searches but that we excluded from the final case sets.
This recording, which includes brief explanations, helped to assure consistency in
the standards for inclusion even though those standards are difficult to restate as
clear rules. The results at least are fairly transparent for other researchers.
Time frames also are worth explaining. Four of the five case sets are coded
through June 2016,100 which is a recent and convenient date. This time frame ends
with the most recent complete Supreme Court Term, which ended near the close of
the Obama administration and shortly before Trump’s presidency. The exception for
now is the establishment clause case set,101 which ends earlier. As a whole, the
96 See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 157–58, 204 (indicating that the Epstein dataset
builds on the original Sunstein dataset, adding cases through 2008). Their dataset is available
at Datasets, Full Inventory, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES, http://epstein.wustl.edu
/research/behaviorJudges/chapters.php?reg=11 [https://perma.cc/V3RT-NMUJ].
97 Reviewing the judge votes in each case was important. Sometimes law-student coding
is subject only to scattered mistakes (i.e., the pre-existing commercial speech data set).
Sometimes the student coding is less reliable (i.e., a sizable fraction of errors in coding judge
votes in affirmative action cases). Any manual coding operation of a useful size faces the risk
of error, of course. For what it may be worth, we are confident that we have improved the
accuracy and usefulness of the existing case data in these fields.
98 The exception, for the time being, is the establishment clause case set, which currently
ends in 2005. See infra Table 1.0.
99 Enterprise Architect. The application was coded using Python. Some judgments and
panel member names had to be revised by one of the authors or were omitted by this pio-
neering scraper. But the scraping was hands-free, fast, and usually effective—especially for
more recent decisions. The automation saved a large number of human hours.
100 See infra Table 1.0.
101 See infra Table 1.0.
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recent end points for our case sets will support the careful study of contemporary
constitutional litigation as it now stands.
With respect to starting points, each case set begins on a different date. These
starting points were pegged to important developments in constitutional doctrine at
the Supreme Court, as explained below. The result is that the case sets are not fully
comparable in years of decision, but their starting points are driven by the same
theory. Starting point choices, too, involve judgment. But any constitutional scholar
who is familiar with these doctrinal areas should immediately recognize the Court
cases that we used as starting points:
Commercial Speech—Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission (1980)102: The Central Hudson case formulated the modern standard
for testing commercial speech claims. Each component of the prevailing doctrine
allows some room for judgment, and the final three considerations are self-evidently
toward the standards side of the rules-standards spectrum. Judges must decide
whether the regulatory interest is “substantial,” whether the regulation in question
“directly advances” the asserted interest,103 and whether the fit between the regula-
tion and the interest is, as a subsequent case held, “reasonable.”104
Gun Rights—District of Columbia v. Heller (2008)105: Contemporary gun
rights decisions also suggest significant room for judicial judgment calls, but for
different reasons. The Supreme Court has yet to establish a doctrinal framework for
analyzing large numbers of gun rights claims, and so lower courts are left to gener-
ate doctrine or simply offer results without a firm mid-level decision protocol. The
Supreme Court has established that the right to keep and bear arms is individual in
the sense of being untethered to militia service, and that law-abiding non-mentally
ill people have a right to have a handgun in their home as against a flat ban on
possession.106 But the Court has yet to provide additional clarity.
Abortion Rights—Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey (1992)107: For abortion rights claims, the famous joint opinion in this case
embraced an “undue burden” standard while it revised the trimester framework of
Roe v. Wade.108 Thus Casey is an obvious starting point for analyzing judicial voting
behavior, and the formal complexion of the applicable undue burden doctrine is not
very different from the Central Hudson standard for commercial speech regulation
discussed above.
102 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
103 Id. at 566.
104 Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
105 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
106 See id. at 626–28.
107 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
108 See id. at 873–74 (joint opinion) (criticizing the trimester framework in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), and endorsing an undue-burden test for a category of abortion regulation).
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Establishment Clause—Lee v. Weisman (1992)109: Current case law offers a
number of tests for violations of the establishment clause that are more or less ap-
plicable to different situations. A reasonable observer’s perspective on government
endorsement, if not proselytizing, of religion still seems applicable to government
use of religious symbols.110 This test is comparable in its standard-like character to
Central Hudson’s test for commercial speech regulation. For government funding
of religious activity, the picture is more complicated yet probably more structured.
Funding programs that cut checks to individuals who then make choices across reli-
gious and secular service providers ordinarily will be upheld,111 while programs that
deliver benefits directly to religious organizations may require special efforts to earmark
the benefits for secular activity.112 The Supreme Court also has deployed a coercion
test for religious rituals and prayer with enough flexibility and fact-sensitivity to
allow for reasonable disagreement;113 we begin this case set with the leading coer-
cion case, Lee v. Weisman.114
Affirmative Action Challenges—Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995)115:
Unlike the other case sets, the Supreme Court has announced that it will apply strict
scrutiny to all race-based affirmative action programs.116 On the other hand, the
Court simultaneously emphasized that strict scrutiny will not always be fatal to such
programs,117 and soon enough the Court accepted educational diversity as a suffi-
ciently compelling interest and university judgment as worthy of some measure of
deference.118 This combination of doctrinal messages is adequate to make room in law
for disagreements in practice. Finally, in the employment setting, older Supreme Court
precedent in the Title VII context indicates significant space for private employers
109 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
110 See McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005)
(relying on, among other sources, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (“Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community . . . .”)); id. at 866 (relying on a reasonable observer
perspective from past cases and separate opinions).
111 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388, 398 (1983).
112 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 842–44 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (dis-
cussing the line between direct and indirect aid, and collecting cases).
113 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 587 (reiterating that, at minimum, the Constitution prohibits
government from coercing people into supporting or participating in religion).
114 See id. The Supreme Court also has committed itself against sect discrimination by
government officials. See, e.g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953). But this
issue probably is not as prominent in day-to-day litigation.
115 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
116 See id. at 235.
117 See id. at 237.
118 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
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to voluntarily adopt affirmative action programs.119 At the same time, the recently
mixed constitutional resistance to affirmative action programs at the Supreme Court
means that there is room for reasonable disagreement among judges attempting to
understand, elaborate, and apply existing doctrine.120
B. Dependent Variables
The dependent variable is a judge vote, rather than a case outcome, on the merits
of a claim of interest. A judge’s decision on an issue of procedure or justiciability
surely can be influenced by the judge’s evaluation of the merits of a commercial
speech claim, for instance, but those anterior decisions were generally excluded
from this study.121 We also excluded votes to deny and grant rehearing. But we did
include votes in cases decided en banc as well as by three-judge panels. We also
included votes on applications for stays pending appeal. The claims of interest are
defined with reference to the selection criteria for the case sets.
Each judge vote is either “for the claim,” “for the claim in part,” or “not for the
claim even in part.” In many of our models and in accord with some prior studies,
we collapse the first two possibilities, meaning that a judge vote is coded as support-
ing the claim even if only in part. But as we will see, it is sometimes valuable to be
able to differentiate a judge’s full support from partial support for a claim. The nuance
can be useful.
However, the likelihood that a vote will be coded as “for the claim in part” is
partly a function of how constitutional claims are bundled within cases. More bundling
of more claims tends to increase the chance of a partial-support outcome, all else
equal. If a judge faces a legal claim that is relatively narrow and conceptualized as
a single issue, then partial support for the claim in this given case is unlikely. But
if a judge faces claims that are conceptualized as involving multiple issues in the
same constitutional domain, then the judge might be more liable to support the claim
119 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979) (upholding
an employer’s race-conscious affirmative action plan against a Title VII claim).
120 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016) (“It is the University’s
ongoing obligation to engage in constant deliberation and continued reflection regarding its
admissions policies.”).
121 Cases were excluded from our analysis if the opinions rested on procedural or jus-
ticiability issues and did not address the merits of the constitutional claims of interest. An
exception to this exclusionary rule was made for cases in which one or more judges on a
panel reached the merits while one or more colleagues on the same panel rested their votes
on procedure or justiciability. On these occasions, the cases were left in and judges voting
to block claims on procedure or justiciability were coded as voting neither for the claim nor
for the claim in part. A second exception involves establishment of religion and taxpayer
standing. In that doctrinal field, a claimant’s standing to sue can be affected by the religion-
inflected analysis of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). When Flast-related standing to sue
on establishment claims was at issue, judge votes on this issue were left in the analysis.
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“in part” by either voting for one or more but not all of the claims, or by voting for
part of one of the claims. Either kind of vote was coded as “for the claim in part.”122
To illustrate: In Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith,123 a three-judge panel
voted unanimously to reverse summary judgment in favor of the government de-
fendants.124 A display company had challenged certain state law limits on alcohol
wholesalers paying for advertisements.125 The panel explained that, in their view, the
State had not yet offered persuasive arguments on the third and fourth prongs of the
Central Hudson test, but that further proceedings were necessary to know for sure
whether the regulation was invalid.126 So, each judge was coded as voting “for the
claim in part,” in this instance meaning that the judges supported part of a single claim. 
Other cases involve multiple claims, conventionally speaking. In Planned Parent-
hood Minnesota v. Rounds,127 the panel majority voted to uphold an informed consent
law for abortions that included statements regarding human beings, human relation-
ships, and general medical risks of the procedure, but also voted to invalidate a state-
ment regarding suicide risks.128 So, these two judges were coded as voting “for the
claim in part.” A judge who dissented in part wanted to uphold each of the four
challenged provisions,129 so this judge was coded as voting against the claim (neither
voting for the claim nor voting for the claim in part).
Thus our three-category coding is more nuanced than a two-category coding, but
is still a rather dull edge with which to cut through various outcomes. One could
code even more precisely, for fractions of support in each case with the denominator
defined by analytical sections in judicial opinions, for instance. In Rounds, judges
who supported one fourth of the plaintiff’s constitutional claims got counted as
voting for the claims in part, and those judges end up in a separate category from the
judge who rejected all four claims. But even a more fine-grained coding of votes
would not estimate the doctrinal footprint or social significance of each issue or
case. Votes in a case involving a single issue, somehow defined, might involve far
higher stakes for the parties and society at large than votes in a case involving five
issues, somehow defined. Of course, additional sophistication in manual coding will
likely increase errors and reasonable disagreement. In this Article, we offer a modest
advance in nuance without exhausting the feasible possibilities for coding outcomes.
122 In a small number of commercial speech cases (four), two different judge votes were
coded for each participating judge in order to allow for “deep coding” of a single case with
multiple issues.
123 810 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2016).
124 See id. at 642.
125 Id. at 644–45.
126 Id. at 651–53.
127 653 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 2011), vacating on reh’g en banc in part, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir.
2012).
128 See id. at 673.
129 See id. at 682 (Gruender, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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C. Independent Variables
1. Bare-Bones Models
We started with a bare-bones model in which the only independent variables are
a collection of judge traits, with circuit fixed effects and standard errors clustered
at the judge level. These models were used to analyze each of the five case sets
separately. Demographic traits (sex, race,130 age, tenure on the court of appeals) were
pulled from a Federal Judicial Center database.131 We include both U.S. Court of
Appeals judges and U.S. District Court judges sitting by designation. We exclude
Court of International Trade judges sitting by designation, for whom ideology scores
are often not readily available.
For judge ideology, we use three different proxies and rotate them into separate
regression models. Each scoring system is one-dimensional, is linked to politics
outside the judiciary, and cannot perfectly reflect extralegal policy preferences. But
these proxies do offer credible ways of examining the relationship, if any, between
judicial voting patterns and political disagreement outside the courthouse. In a strict
sense, ideology and demographic traits are hard to describe as independent variables
with respect to the judges who are doing the voting.132 On the other hand, we may
think of the judicial system of adjudication as selecting—usually at random—a set
of judges to vote on claims in a case. This perspective helps us conceptualize judge
ideology and (other) demographic traits as independent variables within the larger
system of adjudication.
Model 1 uses the political party of the appointing president, which is a simple
dichotomous variable that nonetheless tends to perform well compared to competitor
proxies. Model 2 uses Judicial Common Space (JCS) scores developed by Lee Epstein
and others,133 which are continuous variables with theoretical bounds of -1.000 to
represent far left or liberal ideology and 1.000 to represent far right or conservative
130 We have been informed by Winston Bowman, Associate Historian at the Federal
Judicial Center (FJC), that the FJC data on judge race “in the last several decades” has been
based on what the judges themselves self-report on a questionnaire from the Department of
Justice’s Office of Legal Policy. Email from Winston Bowman to Emma Moore (Nov. 16,
2016, 9:52 AM & 9:22 AM) (on file with the authors).
131 The database is available at FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history
/home.nsf/page/judges.html [https://perma.cc/FXU6-3GB3].
132 On the issue of judge traits such as sex being conceptualized as causal variables, see
Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 389, 396–97 (2010).
133 See Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007);
Michael W. Giles et al., Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection
Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623 (2001).
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ideology. These scores were developed to match scores for members of Congress
and the President and thus facilitate comparisons across institutions. Christina Boyd
extended JCS scores to district court judges.134 Model 3 uses the Database on
Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) scores initially developed by
Adam Bonica135 and applied to judges in a recent paper with Maya Sen.136 Like JCS
scores, DIME scores are continuous variables.137
Observed DIME scores are based on an interesting bit of behavior—campaign
contributions made by the person before he or she became a judge—rather than
inferences about each judge’s ideology based on other people who were involved
in the appointment process.138 Some federal judges lack actual DIME scores, however,
especially older judges.139 Bonica and Sen report thirty-five percent missing values
for all federal court of appeals judges, though only nineteen percent missing for such
judges appointed since 2001.140 We rely on “imputed” DIME scores, as well, which
correlate strongly with the observed scores but which are not without weakness.141
134 Boyd’s databases for federal district judges are available at http://clboyd.net/ideology
.html [https://perma.cc/9QLK-JXXT].
135 See Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 367
(2014) [hereinafter Bonica, Mapping]; Adam Bonica, Database on Ideology, Money in
Politics, and Elections (DIME), STAN. U.: SSDS SOC. SCI. DATA COLLECTION, http://data
.stanford.edu/dime [https://perma.cc/K8BG-NB5F].
136 See Adam Bonica & Maya Sen, A Common-Space Scaling of the American Judiciary
and Legal Profession, SEMANTIC SCHOLAR (Oct. 31, 2015), https://pdfs.semanticscholar
.org/7572/185e95e52abbc353ad9ec52f8b3d2d7f4fd6.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DLG-R9N9].
137 See Bonica, Mapping, supra note 135, at 379 (indicating that DIME scores comple-
ment roll-call-based measures of legislator ideology, albeit using a different scale).
138 See Bonica & Sen, supra note 136, at 1–2.
139 See id.
140 See id. at 7.
141 See id. at 8 (reporting a correlation of p = 0.81 between observed and overimputed
DIME scores). Bonica and Sen list the factors in their imputation algorithm:
We include in the multiple imputation model (1) observed DIME and
JCS scores, (2) the type of court, (3) whether the judge attended a law
school ranked #1–14, 15–25, 26–50, 51–70, 71–100, or outside the top
100, (4) birth year, (5) gender, (6) race or ethnicity, (7) prosecutor
experience, (8) public defender experience, (9) professorial or adjunct
experience, (10) whether they were rated “Well Qualified” by the
American Bar Association, and (11) whether the judge clerked for a
liberal or conservative judge. We also include variables reflecting the
political environment at time of nomination, including (12) whether the
nomination arose during a divided government, and (13) dummy vari-
ables for identity of the President making the nomination. Lastly, we
included (14) a variable that captures the average DW-NOMINATE
score for members of the home-state congressional delegation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Along with the debut efforts to validate DIME scores, this study offers an early look
at how the new proxy for judicial ideology compares to the now-standard options.
2. Kitchen-Sink Models
We also developed a more complex model, to investigate other plausible forces
and to see whether any indication of ideology in the bare-bones model would dis-
appear (or reappear) once other factors were controlled for. Our kitchen-sink models
can be thought of as robustness checks, among other functions served.
One focus of this effort was formal law. True, even well-constructed legal vari-
ables may not show up as statistically significant within a law-abiding judiciary,
given selection effects in litigation.142 Good lawyers and clients who can afford not
to litigate will avoid falling into areas of law (procedural, substantive, or otherwise)
that would disadvantage them. Instead, those actors will settle their disputes, sculpt
their legal claims and workaround the formal legal barriers, or lump it. Nonetheless,
confidently identifying the domains and magnitudes of ideological influence depends
on a well-developed picture of law and legal doctrine. Particularly when the number
of observations is low, law variables can help assure that a set of judges with a par-
ticular ideological leaning did not see a clump of cases legally skewed toward one
outcome that escaped the docket of a second set of judges with a different ideological
leaning. In addition to developing admittedly imperfect yet realistic law-grounded
variables, we added other independent variables that are standard in the field, plus
a few others.
a. Law Variables
Procedure Score: The U.S. Courts of Appeals tend to affirm U.S. District Court
judgments,143 but this “affirmance slant” may or may not be related to formal law.
142 See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–5 (1984) (modeling litigation selection effects with symmetric stakes);
Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717, 1723–27 (1988)
(addressing appellate cases); see also EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 232 (discussing
filtering of appeals if “legalist methodology” can resolve the case and lawyers and litigants
are rational). One key assumption in the Priest-Klein model involves similar stakes for all
sides to the dispute. See Priest & Klein, supra, at 5 (“[T]he relative stakes to the parties will
greatly influence the rate of success in litigation and are likely to be the principal reason why
success rates differ from the 50 percent baseline.”). Empirical challenges to especially strong
selection-effect hypotheses include Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New
Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990).
143 See Chris Guthrie & Tracy E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights
into the “Affirmance Effect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
357, 358 (2005).
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Affirming judgments because the appellate docket load is heavy is not an indication
of fidelity to the law, for example.144 To better account for the procedural posture
of the judgments appealed in our dataset, we constructed a procedure score. The
score attempts to track the relevant standard of review established in formal law and,
if that standard is de novo, to account for the procedural law that applies to the
relevant motion in the district court.145 Negative scores represent procedural postures
in which the claimant is supposed to be at a formal legal disadvantage, while posi-
tive scores are meant to represent a formal legal advantage for the claimant. A score
of zero indicates no substantial formal legal advantage either way from the proce-
dural posture: for example, cross-motions for summary judgment where both sides’
motions are then at issue on appeal.146
Most of the scores for most of the procedural postures in our dataset should
impress practicing lawyers as uncontroversial—again, as a matter of formal law. For
instance, all else equal, a commercial speech claimant should have a harder time
attacking an adverse bench trial judgment on appeal (-2) than defending a favorable
bench trial judgment (+2) or a preliminary injunction (+2), because the latter two
outcomes are supposed to be reviewed only for clear error or abuse of discretion
apart from questions of law.147 Furthermore, successful summary judgment motions
and successful motions to dismiss are both reviewed de novo,148 but parties facing
144 For evidence of affirmance rates increasing in one part of the docket after a dramatic
increase of cases to dispose of in another part of the docket, see the excellent Bert I. Huang,
Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (2011).
145 In a similar spirit but with different coding constraints is Frank Cross’s important contri-
bution to understanding the role of procedural posture in the federal courts of appeals. See
CROSS, supra note 10, at 49–56 (suggesting influence of both ideology and procedure, and
acknowledging that not every procedural context variable had been coded precisely). A small
number of appeals in our dataset arose from federal agency action. For want of a more so-
phisticated scoring system, petitions for review of agency action were assigned a procedure
score of zero.
146 Occasionally, appellate judges invoke the “constitutional fact” doctrine to justify de
novo review over some part of the appeal that would otherwise require some degree of
deference to trial-level conclusions. See, e.g., Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th
Cir. 2011) (“[W]e review the core constitutional facts de novo, unlike historical facts, which
are measured only for clear error.”). That doctrine appears to be invoked rarely in our dataset
and, at this stage, we have not coded for its invocation. In the absence of a fairly clear pre-
existing doctrine of constitutional fact, we have been reluctant to code the procedure score
for an appellate case based on the judges themselves invoking the doctrine—an event which
is at least arguably an outcome that is part of the judges’ votes, rather than an independent
variable to help explain judge votes.
147 A list of procedure scores is available in the codebook for this project, which is on file
with the authors.
148 See, e.g., Poughkeepsie Supermarket Corp. v. Dutchess Cty., 648 F. App’x 156, 157
(2d Cir. 2016) (involving a motion to dismiss); Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir.
2010) (involving a motion for summary judgment).
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summary judgment must come up with some kind of evidence beyond the pleadings
to support their view of contested issues of material fact.149 All else equal, a claimant
who lost on a motion to dismiss should have an easier time attacking the judgment
on appeal (+3) compared to a claimant who lost on summary judgment (+2). Some
of these scores, however, are subject to reasonable debate and improvement.150
Doctrinal Subset Score: The universe of “commercial speech cases” is some-
what diverse. Like any field of repeated litigation, judges developed tributaries of
doctrine—without a clean break from the more general doctrinal field in question.151
Empiricists face judgment calls on whether to treat these apparent doctrinal tributar-
ies separately; in the end, there might not be an empirically defensible universal
category for what lawyers call commercial speech cases. From a lawyer’s perspec-
tive, however, many of these subdomains are easy to identify. Often enough, judges
explain to us that they are applying a special doctrine within the field of, say, the
constitutional law of commercial speech, and that this special doctrine provides a
relative advantage to claimants or others, or a special way of analyzing the issue.
For each case set, we selected three or more doctrinal subsets that are supported
by formal doctrine and that appeared with some frequency in our datasets. These
subsets were combined into a simple scoring system: Each subset was assigned a
value from 1 to 5, based on a judgment of the strength of claims within the subset
all else equal; if more than one subset applied to a single judge vote, the subset scores
were averaged. To illustrate within the commercial speech case set, we coded for
“the law of billboards” (1),152 disclosure regulations normally governed by Zauderer
(2),153 the regulation of professions such as lawyer and chiropractor advertising
149 See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–24 (1986) (indicating that the
federal rules require a nonmoving party who bears the burden of persuasion on a material
issue of fact to offer support beyond the party’s pleadings, although not necessarily evidence
that is already in admissible form).
150 For example, it is difficult to score precisely any differences in formal legal advantage
to claimants between, say, a party defending against a commercial speech claim who appeals
from an adverse judgment after a bench trial (+2) and a commercial speech claimant who
appeals from a successful motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (+3). All else equal
and concentrating on the formal law of procedure, a claimant probably should prefer to attack
a motion to dismiss for which the claimant’s well-pled factual allegations are supposed to
be taken as true along with plausible inferences therefrom, compared to defending success
after a bench trial for which the trial-level fact conclusions are subject to review for clear
error. But the comparison is complicated, admittedly, partly because lawyers naturally com-
bine the formal law of procedure with practical judgments about the likelihood of appellate
judges disrupting a costly trial compared to a quick and dirty dismissal.
151 See TRIBE, supra note 26, at 890–901 (recounting early doctrinal developments).
152 See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (“We deal here
with the law of billboards.”).
153 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 650 (1985) (observing “material differences between disclosure requirements and
outright prohibitions on speech”).
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(3),154 the regulation of broadcast advertising (4),155 and mandatory assessments to
finance generic advertising campaigns such as “Beef. It’s what’s for dinner” (5).156
Each case set has its own separate list of doctrinal subsets.157 As with the procedure
score, observers should not confidently predict that the doctrinal subset codings will
show statistically significant correlations with judge votes. Even if these tributary
doctrines are meaningful and all judges follow them, litigation selection effects can
moderate or eliminate their significance.
Supreme Court Case Score: We then built another law-related variable based
on Supreme Court decisions within two years before a given judge vote. Our theory
is that lower court judges pay some attention to messages from the Supreme Court,
and that relevant actors will not always be willing or able to adjust their positions
to avoid litigation in the wake of a Supreme Court decision. Hence we collected
Supreme Court decisions relevant to each of the five case sets, coded each Court
decision as either opposing or supporting the relevant claim, and then converted
those dummy variables into continuous scores. The conversion was done by adjust-
ing for the number of citations in the courts of appeals within one year and also
within two years of the Supreme Court decision, to get a sense of each case’s impact
below; the largest number of citations for a single one-year time frame (thirty-five
for Agostini v. Felton158 during its second year on the books) was used as the
denominator. When more than one Supreme Court decision fell within the same
time frame, we averaged the scores. We further calibrated these scores according to
the overall number of decisions on the merits in the courts of appeals; the same
number of citations is more impressive evidence of impact when the overall docket
is relatively small. However, this variable is not precise enough to exclude citations
in opinions for cases on which the relevant judges are voting. And not every Supreme
Court decision will be followed faithfully as opposed to worked around.
b. Affirmance Bias—Circuit Affirmance Score
Scholars have noted a so-called affirmance bias in the federal courts of ap-
peals.159 Most judgments are outright affirmed when we look at the entire docket of
154 See, e.g., Harrell v. Fla. Bar, 608 F.3d 1241, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding the
Florida bar’s pre-broadcast review of attorney advertising).
155 See id. at 1270–71.
156 See, e.g., United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1121–22 (3d Cir. 1989).
157 A list of the doctrinal subsets is available in the codebook for this project, which is on
file with the authors.
158 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (rejecting an establishment clause claim).
159 See CROSS, supra note 10, at 48–49, 52 (reporting that most votes were to affirm in the
relevant circuit court dataset, and that circuit courts are more likely to reverse district court 
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the appellate courts.160 And this tilt toward letting stand trial-level results probably
is not fully accounted for in formal procedural law. A kind of status quo bias might
be operating, with the judgment below representing the relevant status quo. Instead
of using a dummy variable for whether the claimant is the appellant on a relevant
claim, however, we built a more precise measure. We calculated a circuit affirmance
score for each judge vote, using that particular circuit’s overall affirmance rate for
the calendar year in question.161 We use that affirmance rate if the claimant is the re-
spondent on appeal; if the claimant is the appellant, we use one minus that rate. These
numbers thereby account for who is seeking affirmance as well as the variance in the
overall willingness to disrupt district court decisions across circuits and across time.
c. Claimant Traits
Claimant Plaintiff: A different kind of status quo bias, also not fully accounted
for in formal law, might operate in favor of defendants at the trial level. Plaintiffs
always seek to disrupt the status quo in some sense, and perhaps trial judges prefer
to leave private ordering and ordinary politics alone. On the other hand, plaintiffs
to some extent pick their targets while defendants ordinarily do not. The opportunity
to initiate litigation and formulate the initial terms of a dispute easily can be advan-
tageous to the first-moving party; this initial litigation choice should reflect litigation
selection effects. Which force will dominate (status quo bias, selection effects, some
other force) is not fully clear theoretically. We include a dummy variable for whether
the claimant is the plaintiff.
Claimant Pro Se: Like the foregoing traits, being pro se is not supposed to
matter under formal law. But of course pro se litigants are usually at a serious
disadvantage against parties represented by professional counsel. The only obvious
exception is for pro se litigants who are themselves lawyers.162 We include a dummy
variable for whether the claimant is pro se.
judgments that favor plaintiffs instead of defendants); cf. Donald R. Songer et al., Do the
“Haves” Come Out Ahead over Time? Applying Galanter’s Framework to Decisions of the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1925–1988, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 811, 819 tbl.2 (1999) (showing
a range of success rates on appeal, depending on party type).
160 See Guthrie & George, supra note 143, at 359.
161 In general, we used the year-ending-in-December figures from the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts. Recent figures are available in Tables B-5 and B-8, Federal
Judicial Caseload Statistics, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis
-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics [https://perma.cc/BFY9-GD7H]. For years 1992,
1993, and 1994, the December figures were not available so we used the year-ending-in-
September figures instead.
162 Other possible exceptions are for well-informed and skilled jailhouse lawyers.
856 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:827
Claimant Individual: Other claimant traits might also correlate with persua-
siveness in court. One supporting theory is that identifiable claimant types are more
or less likely to access skilled professional counsel, whether because of resource ad-
vantages or otherwise. Another supporting theory is that certain claimant types are
more attractive to judges, apart from the indications of formal law. The theoretically
plausible coding options are almost limitless, but only some claimant traits are quickly
and reliably identified. One of them is whether the claimant is an individual. We
include a dummy variable for whether at least one of the claimants is an individual.
Claimant “Small Business” and “Big Business”: For the reasons just men-
tioned, business claimants might be treated more or less favorably by judges in
various domains of litigation.163 At least some business claimants might have greater
litigation resources or litigation prowess; or some business claimants might prompt
a more protective attitude from judges sympathetic to market players.164 We make
an initial stab at distinguishing big businesses from small businesses. In this initial
attempt, we include a dummy variable for whether at least one of the claimants is
a small business—operationalized as any business not coded as a big business. And
“big business” is subjectively coded for whether at least one of the claimants either
is a household name (Anheuser-Busch, for example, or R.J. Reynolds Tobacco) or
was described in the relevant judicial opinion as operating on a national or interna-
tional scale. Only a fairly small number of businesses in the commercial speech case
set are coded as “big”; and that label seems inapt for nearly every other claimant in
the other case sets. In any event, more objective and precise measures of “big business”
are worth pursuing in future research.165
Claimant Interest Group: Other claimants with plausibly different and better
prospects for success in litigation are organized interest groups and, perhaps, non-
profits with an interest in the field of law at issue. Granted, not all of these groups
are relatively well financed nor do all of these groups enjoy wide strategic and
tactical discretion to maximize litigation success. Sometimes interest groups “win
by losing” in litigation, to the extent that a loss can be blamed on a dangerous judiciary
and opposing forces, and that such losses can generate salient examples for sympa-
thetic observers and potential donors to the cause.166 Even so, trade associations and
abortion rights organizations, to name two, are worth flagging to see how they fare
163 See Songer et al., supra note 159, at 815 tbl.1.
164 See id. at 816 (reviewing how courts have gone through pro-business periods).
165 See infra note 188 and accompanying text (listing a few measurement options for
business size or name recognition).
166 See generally Douglas Nejaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 945
(2011) (“When savvy advocates lose in court, they may nonetheless configure the loss in
ways that result in productive social movement effects and lead to more effective reform
strategies.”).
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in court. We include a dummy variable for whether at least one of the claimants is
an interest group or nonprofit.
d. Case Traits
Criminal Case: Particular case types might also give rise to special judicial
treatment. We include a dummy variable for whether the case is criminal in nature,
including applications for post-conviction relief such as habeas corpus. Criminal law
boasts its own special set of formal legal norms, of course. Criminal cases also tend
to be distinctive because of the stakes involved. Criminal defendants regularly face
high penalties if an appeal is unsuccessful and low costs for pursuing an appeal,
assuming access to an acceptable government-paid attorney.
Level of Law Under Challenge: Different levels of government—federal, state,
local—might produce different kinds of laws or decisions that are more or less vul-
nerable to judicial review. Only rarely have judges made the level of government law
or decision relevant to formal constitutional doctrine.167 Nevertheless, different levels
of government respond to different combinations of political forces; different and
potentially less diverse political forces are at work at the local and state levels com-
pared to national level politics, even though many policy debates are nationalized
in some sense. In addition, different levels of government might well have different
levels and quality of legal counsel and legal prowess, before and after litigation
begins. Local and even state governments plausibly have fewer resources and pos-
sibly less relevant litigation experience compared to federal officials defending
federal programs. We include a three-value variable {1, 2, 3} for the level of govern-
ment under challenge, with the higher values representing state or local government
action at issue, with the District of Columbia counted as a local government.168
Source of Law Under Challenge: With less certain theoretical grounding, it
could be that a claimant’s prospects are influenced by the source of law or decision
167 One exception can be found in the field of affirmative action challenges. For a period
of time, the Supreme Court indicated that affirmative action programs involving race would
be easier to defend at the federal level than when adopted by a local government. See Metro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564–65 (1990) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a federal
program and distinguishing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (plurality
opinion), which had adopted strict scrutiny while reviewing a local program), overruled by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (indicating that some form of
strict scrutiny applies to all race-based affirmative action programs). This time period is not
within our data set of affirmative action cases.
168 Some studies of judicial behavior code for the non-claimant’s party type. Our government-
level and source-of-law variables usually cover the party-type territory, but not always.
Occasionally, a relevant claim is made against a private party. For example, a private-party
defendant in a civil suit brought by a private-party plaintiff might assert that civil liability
would amount to a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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within a given level of government. Most government institutions are uncontro-
versially categorized as executive, legislative, or judicial, and it seems possible that
the kinds of decisions that each produces or the features of each institution will be
seen more or less favorably by judges. For instance, perhaps federal judges generally
have more confidence in the judgment of other judges when under constitutional chal-
lenge, compared to executive officer decisions that might ordinarily lack the kind
of apparent deliberation valued by federal judges. Our priors are not strong here. But
we include another three-value variable {1, 2, 3} to represent executive, legislative,
and judicial sources of law or decision.
e. Panel Effects—Panel Republicans Fraction
A judge’s behavior might be influenced by colleagues. For example, a panel of
judges might be influenced by each other’s arguments, traits, or positions once they
are revealed. Our focus in this study is not intra-panel dynamics, but our datasets do
offer a renewed opportunity for examining them. We begin this effort with a simple
variable for one type of partisan panel effect: the party affiliation of other judges on
each panel, measured here as the fraction of other judges who are Republican
appointees.169 Using a fraction allows extension of the variable from three-judge
panels to en banc proceedings. En banc proceedings have special features, of course,
but some existing panel effects theories based on deliberation, learning, monitoring,
and so forth might apply to the en banc setting. In any event, en banc decisions can
be dropped from the analysis if need be.
3. Commercial-Speech Variables
Two additional variables are special to the commercial speech case set, inspired
by research into the issues and disagreements among judges.
a. Disclosure Cases
First, we retrained our focus on claims against disclosure. Constitutional doctrine
does not indicate that these cases should be especially controversial, but recent litigation
169 Our approach is in the spirit of tests for so-called contextual panel effects in Joshua
Fischman, Interpreting Circuit Court Voting Patterns: A Social Interactions Framework, 31
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 808, 813–14, 827–29 (2015) (describing the model and reporting mixed
results)—although Fischman was pursuing a sophisticated investigation into a norm of panel
consensus based on panel colleagues’ votes, somehow revealed, see id. at 829–31 (reporting
larger and fairly consistent results in an endogenous panel effects model). His findings are
impressive but we do not follow up on his model here.
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results indicate that the issue is indeed divisive.170 By separating out commercial
speech cases that involve disclosure requirements—such as a warning to consumers,
a graphic image on cigarette packaging, an explanation to contextualize promotional
messages from lawyers—we can begin to investigate whether judges operate differ-
ently in these case settings, and whether “commercial speech” was the most illumi-
nating domain definition. We include a dummy variable to flag commercial speech
cases that involved disclosure requirements of some kind, whether or not other com-
mercial speech claims were at issue.
b. Advertising Content
We also wondered whether the content of commercial advertising might influ-
ence judicial rulings, beyond what formal constitutional doctrine permits. When
judges determine that the content of commercial speech, or the target of commercial
speech regulation, is untruthful, misleading, or advertises unlawful transactions, then
existing constitutional doctrine does allow this content to drive results.171 But other
advertising content might have an ideological valence and might prompt greater
ideological influence on voting behavior.172 Many commercial speech cases do not
involve advertising content with any obvious or even plausible ideological tinge;
“the law of billboards” does not lend itself to straightforward ideological coding.
But a subset of the cases in our commercial speech set offered up advertising content
with a plausible ideological valence.
This subset of cases amenable to ideological categorization was coded, based
on our judgment, as either ideologically left or right:
Left-Wing Advertising—advertisements for (1) alcohol, (2)
gambling, (3) sexually explicit businesses, and (4) drug para-
phernalia.
Right-Wing Advertising—advertisements for (1) cigarettes,
(2) guns, (3) pregnancy centers, and (4) racially charged or politi-
cally incorrect content.173
170 See sources cited supra note 81 (collecting some recent disclosure cases and divisions
among judges therein).
171 See Samaha, supra note 73, at 1329–33.
172 For a recent empirical study of Supreme Court voting behavior in free speech cases,
which also relates judge votes to speech content, see Epstein et al., supra note 16 (using a
Bayesian framework and reporting that speech content that was coded liberal correlated with
more support for claims protecting such speech by judges with liberal ideology scores).
173 See, e.g., Hous. Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 943 F.2d 644,
645 (6th Cir. 1991) (involving real estate advertisements which feature only white models).
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In a handful of cases, the advertising content was apparent but no single, intuitive ideo-
logical grouping was available.174 Those cases, along with cases in which advertising
content was not described or targeted by regulation, were scored as ideologically
neutral or unclear. These judgments are debatable, it should be emphasized. Readers
are encouraged to critically evaluate these groupings and to suggest alternatives.
III. RESULTS
A. Summary Statistics
The summary statistics in Table 1.0 show that commercial speech cases are
roughly typical along several dimensions. The fraction of judge votes for the com-
mercial speech claim(s) at issue is about one-third, for instance, with another one in
ten votes for part of the claim(s) at issue. The estimated fraction of votes to affirm
is over one half, and the claimant is usually the appellant and very often the plaintiff.
The fraction of judge votes involving individual claimants is on the low side, how-
ever, while the fraction involving small business claimants is on the high side. No
other case set includes claimants assigned to the big-business category. Overall, the
cases in the five sets seem to cluster within two or three doctrinal subsets. As well,
the procedure scores clump at -2 and +2.
The gun rights case set is an outlier. Nearly three-fourths of the observations in-
volve criminal cases, four in five involve challenges to federal action, the estimated
fraction of votes to affirm approaches nine out of ten, and over ninety percent of judge
votes are against the claimant. These claims are, bluntly speaking, outstanding losers.
Below, we will sometimes break out civil litigation over gun rights, which looks more
like the other case sets. The civil claimant success rate in attracting at least partial sup-
port for gun rights is about one in five judge votes—which still falls short of our
other claimants’ track records but is closer.175 A satisfying explanation for the patterns
in gun rights litigation will have to wait, however. No simple explanation, such as
legal uncertainty or lax regulation, is convincing at this early stage of research.176
174 For example, the Bad Frog Brewery case involving a company’s effort to use a cartoon
image of a frog giving you the finger on its beer bottle labels. See Bad Frog Brewery, Inc.
v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1998).
175 See infra Figure 1.0 (displaying judge vote percentages for various case sets, including
civil gun rights claims).
176 Lawyers and parties considering whether to file or persist in civil litigation have some
freedom to pick their targets, and we might well assume that they will choose thoughtfully
in light of the costs and potential benefits of litigation. If regulation is generally lax, lawyers
and litigants may turn their attention to the more vulnerable regulatory efforts. If legal
doctrine is uncertain, we might predict relatively high levels of persistent litigation but not
necessarily relatively low levels of success. Legal uncertainty opens room for disagreement
and refusal to settle, but does not indicate systematic losses for one side. Although the numbers
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Getting started on judicial ideology, the summary statistics indicate that com-
mercial speech claims are like gun rights claims in that ideology might play a small
role, while ideology might play a large role in abortion rights, establishment clause,
and anti-affirmative action claims. Democratic and Republican appointees vote for
commercial speech and gun rights claims at about the same rate, although Demo-
cratic appointees might be more willing to support commercial speech claims in part
compared to Republican appointees, and Democratic appointees are not yet showing
support of gun rights claims in full. In fact, the judicial support for gun rights claims
is so terribly low that this field of litigation might not be amenable to grouping with
other claims. In any event, the voting patterns of Democratic and Republican appointees
look starkly different in the abortion, establishment, and anti-affirmative action case
sets. Gaps of more than twenty-five percent open up in these case sets, in the antic-
ipated directions, with Democratic appointees also showing a twelve percent greater
willingness to support abortion rights claims in part.
are small, it is interesting to note that the success rate for abortion rights claims during the
eight years after Casey is higher, not lower, than the success rate for the entire abortion rights
case set: About 64% of the votes were for the claim(s) at least in part, compared to 58% for the
entire case set, with a 40% gap between Republican and Democratic appointees in the early
period (n = 88).
Among the possibilities worth considering are stakes and resources. Perhaps, for example,
the litigation arm of the gun rights movement is generally better financed than other constitu-
tional litigation shops, and can afford to litigate claims that are unlikely to prevail. And
perhaps a high fraction of litigation losses are tolerable for this class of litigants because
persistent litigation maintains high expected costs for regulators who otherwise would like
to innovate with new gun policies—and perhaps litigation losses can be used to promote the
cause to gun owners, who may be reminded that judges are not willing to establish their
preferred gun policies and who may then increase their material support for the broader
cause. Or perhaps gun rights claimants and lawyers are relatively more committed to their
cause, are less influenced by a global litigation plan of some organizing body, and are not
dissuaded by judicial rejection. But again, the factors that might make gun rights litigation
special will have to be explored in future work.
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Table 1.0: Summary Statistics
Commercial
Speech
Gun
Rights
Abortion
Rights
Establishment
Clause
Anti-
Affirmative
Action
1980–2016 2008–2016 1992–2016 1992–2005 1995–2016
Observations 759 517 262 481 321
Vote for the
claim(s) 32% 2% 42% 33% 40%
Vote for part of the
claim(s) 10% 7% 16% 10% 16%
Vote for neither of
the above 58% 91% 42% 57% 44%
Republican vote
for the claim(s) 33% 3% 30% 22% 55%
Democrat vote for
the claim(s) 32% 0% 63% 47% 19%
Republican-Demo-
crat difference 1% 3% -33% -25% 36%
Republican vote
for part of the
claim(s) 7% 7% 12% 10% 16%
Democrat vote for
part of the claim(s) 13% 8% 24% 11% 16%
Republican-Demo-
crat difference -6% -1% -12% -1% -1%
Vote for claim,
claimant appellant 15% 0% 35% 17% 15%
Vote against claim,
nonclaimant
appellant 42% 87% 7% 43% 32%
Vote to affirm
(estimated) 57% 87% 42% 59% 47%
Criminal case 1% 74% 0% 4% 0%
Published opinion 90% 54% 99% 96% 97%
En banc 10% 4% 20% 24% 23%
Review of agency 6% 0% 0% 0% 2%
Judge Republican
appointee 54% 56% 63% 59% 58%
Judge JCS (mean) 0.061 0.063 0.092 0.067 0.064
Judge DIME with
imputed values
(mean) 0.088 0.107 0.261 0.140 0.122
Judge age at time
of vote (mean
years) 64 66 63 62 64
Judge tenure at
time of vote (mean
years) 14 16 14 13 14
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Commercial
Speech
Gun
Rights
Abortion
Rights
Establishment
Clause
Anti-
Affirmative
Action
1980–2016 2008–2016 1992–2016 1992–2005 1995–2016
Judge male 78% 76% 79% 83% 80%
Judge white 86% 79% 90% 87% 88%
Judge Asian
American 2% 0% 1% 1% 1%
Judge Hispanic 5% 8% 4% 4% 4%
Judge African
American 7% 12% 5% 8% 7%
District judge 8% 4% 7% 5% 3%
Panel Republicans,
fraction of others
(mean) 0.54 0.56 0.63 0.58 0.58
Claimant plaintiff 87% 29% 99% 95% 86%
Claimant appellant
(no cross appeals) 64% 95% 17% 63% 63%
Claimant pro se 1% 6% 1% 4% 2%
Individual claimant 45% 100% 91% 88% 76%
“Small business”
claimant 55% 5% 42% 2% 10%
“Big business”
claimant 11% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Interest group
claimant 19% 10% 46% 33% 21%
Amicus
participation 34% 14% 47% 41% 49%
Level of law chal-
lenged 1, federal 27% 80% 5% 11% 17%
Level of law chal-
lenged 2, state 41% 9% 94% 30% 29%
Level of law chal-
lenged 3, local 32% 11% 1% 59% 45%
Source of law chal-
lenged 1, executive 21% 9% 5% 46% 69%
Source of law
challenged 2,
legislative 69% 84% 95% 38% 12%
Source of law chal-
lenged 3, judicial 9% 7% 0% 2% 10%
Supreme Court
case score average
(mean) -0.03 0.18 -0.02 -0.14 0.02
Doctrinal subset
score average
(mean) 2.65 2.20 3.55 3.01 1.70
Procedure score
(mean) 0.19 -1.10 0.47 -0.17 0.76
864 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:827
Figure 1.0: Fraction of Judges Voting for the Claim in Whole or in Part, by
Case Set and Party of the Appointing President
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B. Regression Analysis
1. Bare-Bones Models
With respect to ideological influence, our bare-bones specifications confirm the
indications in the summary statistics. And the evidence of standard ideological divides
appears without much complicating influence from other judge traits. Tables A.1,
A.2, and A.3 present binomial logit estimates. The dependent variable in these models
is dichotomous, measuring whether a judge voted to reject a claim (0) or support it
either in part or in whole (1). Each case set is treated as a unique sample and thus
estimated separately. The models in each of the three tables are identical with the
exception of the ideology variable. Table A.1 presents binomial logit estimates when
the party of the appointing president is the proxy for judicial ideology; Table A.2
uses Judicial Common Space scores instead; and Table A.3 uses judge DIME scores
including imputed values.
None of our judge demographic traits (age, experience, sex, race) are statisti-
cally significant predictors of voting behavior in any of our case sets, with one ex-
ception. Judges recorded as Asian American by the Federal Judicial Center appear
less likely to vote in favor of establishment clause claims (p < 0.05),177 controlling
for other traits including our ideology proxies. But that’s it for demography.
In addition, ordinary ideology seems boxed out of some case sets. None of our
three judicial ideology variables are statistically significant in the commercial speech
case set, in the gun rights case set, or in the gun rights case set when restricted to civil
litigation. True, Figure 1.0 does show that Republican appointees supported gun rights
claims in civil suits more often than did Democratic appointees, and that a Demo-
cratic appointee has yet to support a gun rights claim in full. But, again, the variable
identifying judges as Democratic or Republican appointees is not a statistically signif-
icant predictor in gun rights cases, nor are the other two proxies for judicial ideology.
Perhaps a partisan gap in judge votes will grow and become meaningful if and when
gun rights claims get further off the floor. Commercial speech claims, it is worth
emphasizing, already are off the floor. These claims have a success rate of over 40%
177 Such p values represent the probability that a regression coefficient’s value would
appear as a matter of chance. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 20–21. A p value of less
than 0.05, for example, indicates that the result is less than 5% likely to have appeared by
chance. Id. The proper level of statistical significance to use is not entirely clear when decision
makers face hard policy choices and reliable information is scarce. See Philip J. Cook & Jens
Ludwig, Aiming for Evidence-Based Gun Policy, 25 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 691, 694
(2006) (“[T]he standard for policy-relevant evidence should, in our view, be different and
based on expected values of costs and benefits for the policies being evaluated.”). That said,
and for whatever weight that conventions should receive, a p value above 0.05 will not inspire
widespread agreement among empirical legal scholars that “the effect is real.” Unless otherwise
indicated, in our discussion we will treat p values above 0.05 as not statistically significant.
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in attracting judge votes for at least part of an objection to advertising regulation.
But our proxies for ordinary ideological divisions are not demonstrably helpful in
explaining judge voting behavior in the commercial speech case set.
The other case sets are different. All three of our judicial ideology variables are
statistically significant (p < 0.01) in the abortion rights, establishment clause, and
anti-affirmative action case sets.178
Figure 2.0 gives a sense of the substantive effects of the three ideology variables
across five case sets, with gun rights claims restricted to civil suits. Here we can see
the probability—predicted from estimates shown in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3—that
judges with particular ideology scores vote in favor of at least part of the relevant
claim(s). In each of these simulations, the ideology variable increases from its mini-
mum value to its maximum value while all other variables are held at their means.179
The far-left side of the x-axes represents judges with the lowest (i.e., the most left-
leaning) scores on the ideology variables; the far-right side of the x-axes, on the other
hand, represents judges with the highest (i.e., the most right-leaning) scores on the
ideology variables. Predicted probabilities on the y-axes correspond to the solid lines,
which are surrounded by 95% confidence intervals, represented by dotted lines.
The different ideology variables do show somewhat different magnitudes of
influence. The party of the appointing president indicates somewhat less ideological
influence in the abortion, establishment, and anti-affirmative action case sets (where
the differences in predicted probabilities between minimum and maximum judge
ideology scores range from 0.27 to 0.41), compared to JCS scores (where the proba-
bility differences range from 0.39 to 0.60), and DIME scores (where the differences
range from 0.63 to 0.73). Choosing the best ideology measure requires additional
information and judgment. That said, all three variables and the associated predicted
probabilities suggest that garden-variety ideological divisions map onto judicial
treatment of abortion rights claims and affirmative action challenges somewhat
better than establishment clause claims. The low-versus-high ideology score differ-
ences in predicted probabilities are smallest in the establishment clause case set,
albeit still significant.
178 Following Epstein, Landes, and Posner, we have clustered standard errors at the judge
level in an effort to make our tests for statistical significance more conservative. See EPSTEIN
ET AL., supra note 25, at 23–24 (explaining that judge votes can be treated separately and yet
standard errors estimated by clustering observations by judge). “By reducing the number of
separate observations in calculating standard errors, clustering produces higher standard
errors and therefore lower estimates of statistical significance—and rightly so, for otherwise
we would fool ourselves into thinking that we had many more independent observations than
we do.” Id.; see also Sag et al., supra note 25, at 837 n.168 (discussing clustering at the judge
or case level to avoid missing true nulls, and also indicating that fixed effects would be even
more effective but, for one thing, statistical models might break down depending on the
number of observations). We include circuit fixed effects, but not case or judge fixed effects.
179 See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 22–23 (discussing the reporting of marginal
effects and predicted probabilities in logistic regression analyses involving dichotomous
independent variables).
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Table A.1 (Binomial Logit Estimates): Bare-Bones Models—Vote for Claim in
Whole or in Part—Party of the Appointing President
Independent
Variables
Commercial
Speech
Gun
Rights
Gun Rights—
Civil
Abortion
Rights
Establishment
Clause
Anti-Affirmative
Action
Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1
judge_party -0.133
(0.173)
0.216
(0.327)
0.586
(0.506)
-2.168***
(0.378)
[0.85  0.44]
-1.258***
(0.228)
[0.58  0.31]
1.772***
(0.352)
[0.34  0.69]
judge_age 0.00523
(0.0117)
-0.0220
(0.0314)
-0.0455
(0.0458)
0.0181
(0.0297)
0.0177
(0.0176)
0.00671
(0.0249)
judge_tenure -0.0119
(0.0110)
0.00931
(0.0295)
0.0533
(0.0445)
-0.0126
(0.0352)
-0.0191
(0.0207)
-0.0427
(0.0286)
judge_gender -0.0253
(0.221)
-0.174
(0.390)
0.111
(0.597)
0.192
(0.401)
-0.322
(0.282)
-0.489
(0.357)
judge_asian
american
0.383
(0.395)
– – – -1.667**
(0.777)
0.338
(1.707)
judge_hispanic 0.0290
(0.258)
0.569
(0.384)
0.534
(0.708)
-0.0240
(1.203)
0.847
(0.660)
-0.0257
(0.588)
judge_african
american
0.0999
(0.275)
-0.523
(0.641)
-0.693
(1.265)
-0.250
(0.493)
0.198
(0.323)
-1.011
(0.689)
Constant -1.488**
(0.734)
-0.679
(1.892)
1.667
(2.485)
0.760
(1.878)
-1.779
(1.267)
-2.140
(1.504)
Circuit fixed
effects
     
Errors
clustered at
judge-level
     
Observations 757 432 115 253 481 309
Pseudo R2 0.0487 0.0862 0.0823 0.205 0.116 0.209
Chi-squared 58.62 26.60 11.79 45.13 71.02 75.55
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
“–” indicates dropped variables.
“” indicates the highest pseudo R2 value among the three models within each case set or case subset.
In brackets are predicted probabilities of a vote in favor of the claim(s) or part of the claim(s) as one
variable changes [minimum value  maximum value] and all other variables are held at their means.
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Table A.2 (Binomial Logit Estimates): Bare-Bones Models—Vote for Claim in
Whole or in Part—Judicial Common Space Scores
Independent
Variables
Commercial
Speech
Gun
Rights
Gun Rights—
Civil
Abortion
Rights
Establishment
Clause
Anti-Affirmative
Action
Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2
judge_JCS -0.161
(0.258)
0.288
(0.463)
0.319
(0.699)
-3.128***
(0.578)
[0.91  0.31]
-1.748***
(0.377)
[0.64  0.25]
2.490***
(0.531)
[0.25  0.76]
judge_age 0.00543
(0.0118)
-0.0206
(0.0312)
-0.0473
(0.0457)
0.0251
(0.0305)
0.0236
(0.0181)
-0.00258
(0.0237)
judge_tenure -0.0116
(0.0110)
0.00914
(0.0296)
0.0559
(0.0448)
-0.0252
(0.0325)
-0.0313
(0.0215)
-0.0255
(0.0275)
judge_gender -0.0123
(0.223)
-0.178
(0.387)
0.0508
(0.588)
0.134
(0.399)
-0.298
(0.284)
-0.710*
(0.366)
judge_asian
american
0.401
(0.394)
– – – -1.530**
(0.682)
0.409
(1.561)
judge_hispanic -0.0129
(0.254)
0.538
(0.370)
0.360
(0.658)
0.0178
(1.201)
0.905
(0.684)
-0.191
(0.566)
judge_african
american
0.111
(0.273)
-0.555
(0.616)
-0.867
(1.236)
0.149
(0.543)
0.212
(0.314)
-1.271*
(0.749)
Constant -1.576**
(0.727)
-0.672
(1.896)
2.106
(2.442)
-0.463
(1.896)
-2.532*
(1.296)
-0.689
(1.464)
Circuit fixed
effects
     
Errors 
clustered at
judge-level
     
Observations 755 431 115 251 471 306
Pseudo R2 0.0483 0.0859 0.0756 0.198 0.112 0.197
Chi-squared 58.28 26.42 11.39 44.43 65.84 70.97
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
“–” indicates dropped variables.
“” indicates the highest pseudo R2 value among the three models within each case set or case subset.
In brackets are predicted probabilities of a vote in favor of the claim(s) or part of the claim(s) as one
variable changes [minimum value  maximum value] and all other variables are held at their means.
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Table A.3 (Binomial Logit Estimates): Bare-Bones Models—Vote for Claim in
Whole or in Part—Judge DIME Scores Including Imputed Values
Independent
Variables
Commercial
Speech
Gun
Rights
Gun Rights—
Civil
Abortion
Rights
Establishment
Clause
Anti-Affirmative
Action
Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3
judge_DIME
_imputed
0.0709
(0.130)
0.115
(0.206)
0.174
(0.284)
-1.238***
(0.220)
[0.94  0.29]
-1.057***
(0.184)
[0.80  0.17]
1.395***
(0.248)
[0.12  0.85]
judge_age 0.00552
(0.0124)
-0.0213
(0.0317)
-0.0466
(0.0460)
0.0272
(0.0271)
0.0224
(0.0182)
-0.00177
(0.0250)
judge_tenure -0.00877
(0.0120)
0.00991
(0.0300)
0.0544
(0.0450)
-0.0304
(0.0331)
-0.0331
(0.0216)
-0.0282
(0.0274)
judge_gender 0.0233
(0.222)
-0.170
(0.396)
0.0536
(0.596)
0.0772
(0.386)
-0.499*
(0.293)
-0.370
(0.361)
judge_asian
american
0.501
(0.380)
– – – -1.819***
(0.692)
0.775
(1.689)
judge_hispanic 0.0888
(0.244)
0.569
(0.390)
0.424
(0.665)
0.0450
(1.083)
0.521
(0.596)
0.440
(0.665)
judge_african
american
0.197
(0.284)
-0.507
(0.638)
-0.796
(1.239)
0.0470
(0.524)
-0.120
(0.337)
-0.749
(0.715)
Constant -1.721**
(0.749)
-0.604
(1.937)
2.140
(2.478)
-0.380
(1.653)
-2.678**
(1.228)
-0.616
(1.432)
Circuit fixed
effects
     
Errors
clustered at
judge-level
     
Observations 745 432 115 252 478 307
Pseudo R2 0.0496 0.0858 0.0764 0.186 0.129 0.225
Chi-squared 64.48 26.59 11.16 47.62 80.35 64.34
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
“–” indicates dropped variables.
“” indicates the highest pseudo R2 value among the three models within each case set or case subset.
In brackets are predicted probabilities of a vote in favor of the claim(s) or part of the claim(s) as one
variable changes [minimum value  maximum value] and all other variables are held at their means.
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Figure 2.0: Predicted Probabilities of a Vote for the Claim, in Whole or in Part
2017] ARE COMMERCIAL SPEECH CASES IDEOLOGICAL? 871
2. Kitchen-Sink Models
Above we found that ideology mattered in three case sets with minimal controls.
To analyze the influence of other factors on judges’ voting patterns and explore the
extent to which results on the ideology variables are robust to alternative model
specifications, we ran a series of what we call “kitchen-sink” models. In addition to
the judge trait variables that were used in the models reported above, our kitchen-sink
models include controls for a number of variables that may be relevant to judges’ vot-
ing decisions—such as partisan panel effects, law-related variables, circuit affirmance
score, the level of government action under challenge, the source of law under
challenge, criminal as opposed to civil cases, and whether the claimant is the plaintiff,
pro se, an individual, a big business, or an interest group.180
Tables B.1, B.2, and B.3 report binomial logit estimates for our kitchen-sink
models. The first noteworthy feature of these tables is the consistency of the esti-
mates on the ideology variables with those reported above in Tables A.1, A.2, and
A.3. We continue to see statistically significant correlations between all three of our
ideology proxies and voting behavior in the abortion rights, establishment clause,
and anti-affirmative action case sets (p < 0.01). And again the ideology variables fail
to achieve statistical significance in the commercial speech, gun rights, and gun rights
civil case sets. These results indicate that our ideology variables are indeed robust
to alternative model specifications. The pseudo R2 values—which try to express a
model’s goodness of fit with the data181—increase within each case set compared to
the corresponding values in the bare-bones models.
Other judge traits usually are not reliable indicators of voting behavior in our
kitchen-sink models. In gun rights civil cases, however, we find that younger judges
and judges who have more experience are more likely to vote for the claim, either
in part or in whole ( p < 0.05). Furthermore, in these kitchen-sink models we have
collapsed our race variables into one dichotomous variable that distinguishes judges
identifying as African American, Asian American, or Hispanic (1) from judges iden-
tifying as white (0), as recorded by the Federal Judicial Center.182 There is evidence
180 See supra Section II.C.2 (detailing the independent variables used in these kitchen-sink
models).
181 A pseudo R2 can be used with dichotomous dependent variables, such as those we use
here. An introduction to the pseudo R2 statistic from the Institute for Digital Research and
Education is available at IDRE, http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/Psuedo_R
Squareds.htm [https://perma.cc/7ABA-GFN5]. There are many options. We use McFadden’s
pseudo R2. See id. (detailing McFadden’s among other options); see also EPSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 25, at 17–19, 22 (noting that pseudo R2 measures in logistic regressions involving
dichotomous dependent variables “cannot be interpreted in the same way as in linear re-
gression models”).
182 See supra note 130 (describing the source of race data).
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that judge race matters in anti-affirmative action cases, in the sense that people of
color may be more likely to reject the challenge. We note, however, that this finding
is sensitive to model specification. The race variable, for example, is not statistically
significant in models that use judge DIME scores, but is statistically significant
when the judge party variable (p < 0.10) and judge JCS variable (p < 0.05) are used.
A variable identifying male judges is also significant in specifications that use the
JCS ideology variable, but not so for the other judge ideology proxies.
As for partisan panel effects, our variable is statistically significant in the estab-
lishment clause and affirmative action cases in all three models (p < 0.05), but is not
statistically significant in other case sets. Thus the fraction of other judges who were
appointed by Republican presidents does not seem to influence the probability of
votes for or against commercial speech claims, gun rights claims, or abortion rights
claims. Our full case sets do include en banc proceedings, which have not been the
target of panel effects theorizing. But the results do not change much when the
analysis is restricted to three-judge panels. Results are reported in Table B.4, which
uses judge party as the ideology proxy for illustrative purposes. The same two case
sets show partisan panel effects at the same level of significance, while the other
case sets do not. Why partisan panel effects are present and absent in various parts
of the docket, whether en banc proceedings are really any different in terms of col-
league impact, and whether other kinds of panel effects might be present in our case
sets are subjects for future study.
The influence of our law variables is likewise spotty, perhaps indicating the
countervailing influence of litigation selection effects. The Supreme Court case
score is positive and statistically significant in the gun rights case sets ( p < 0.01),
and in two of the models for anti-affirmative action claims (p < 0.05). Otherwise the
Supreme Court case score is only marginally significant at best, except in establish-
ment clause cases using judge party for ideology where, oddly, the variable turns
negative and statistically significant ( p < 0.05). In this particular model, it is as if
circuit court judges resist the Supreme Court’s recent messages in the field, or some
litigants overreact to the most recent Court judgment.
The doctrinal subset score is positive and statistically significant in the abortion
rights and establishment clause case sets ( p < 0.05). Doctrinal subset scores are not
statistically significant in the commercial speech and gun rights case sets. But these
doctrine scores are negative and statistically significant in affirmative action chal-
lenges (p < 0.01).183 Thus our impressions about the implications of affirmative action’s
formal doctrinal tributaries were upside down in terms of judge voting patterns,
apparently, whether because of differing litigation selection effects or otherwise. But
183 The coding of affirmative action doctrinal subsets is 1 for challenges to employment
programs, 2 for challenges to educational programs including admissions policies, and 3 for
challenges to government contracting programs.
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it turned out that, even there, our doctrine scoring system was still somewhat useful
in explaining voting patterns.
The procedure score performs even less evenly. Procedure is not statistically
significant in the general gun rights, abortion rights, and establishment clause case
sets, consistent with lawyers and clients reacting pragmatically to formal procedural
law’s obstacles and opportunities. However, the procedure score is negative and
statistically significant ( p < 0.01) in the commercial speech case set regardless of
model; and the score is sometimes negative and significant in the civil gun rights
and anti-affirmative action case sets, depending on the model. This is surprising,
because the procedure score was constructed with the intent that higher scores would
indicate friendlier formal law for the claimant.184 Whether because of variable selec-
tion effects or otherwise, the formal law of procedure as scored here is not consistently
useful in predicting circuit judge votes.
The circuit affirmance score, which is not trained precisely on law, is more re-
liable. This variable is positive and highly statistically significant ( p < 0.01) in all
three models for three case sets: commercial speech, establishment clause, and anti-
affirmative action claims. These results suggest that lawyers and parties are not fully
able or willing to adjust their litigation decisions to a circuit’s overall inclination to
disrupt district court judgments. Knowing this inclination may help predict outcomes
even in divisive fields of constitutional litigation that are ideologically charged, gener-
ally speaking.
In contrast, neither claimant type nor the level or type of law under challenge
is a reliable predictor of success across our case sets, all else equal. Small businesses
do appear to perform better than other claimants in gun rights cases, and the law
source variable is positive and significant in civil gun rights cases. Additionally, the
law level score looks negative in the guns rights and abortion rights cases, indicating
that federal and/or state action is somewhat easier to attack than local government
action. Those last two results were not easily predicted beforehand, but they remain
isolated in those case sets.
With respect to commercial speech claims, being the plaintiff who picks litigation
targets does seem to pay off. That variable is positive and statistically significant across
models (p < 0.05). Hence no status quo bias in the form of judges resisting those who
instigate litigation is evident in the commercial speech case set. Finally, the coefficient
for “big business” in the full commercial speech case set is positive, but only marginally
significant in all three models. Perhaps this impressionistic variable is not precise
enough to pick up the influence of business resources or name recognition.
184 See supra text accompanying notes 143–50.
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Table B.1 (Binomial Logit Estimates): Kitchen-Sink Models—Vote for Claim
in Whole or in Part—Party of the Appointing President
Independent
Variables
Commercial
Speech
Gun
Rights
Gun Rights—
Civil
Abortion
Rights
Establishment
Clause
Anti-Affirmative
Action
Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1
judge_party -0.119
(0.178)
0.502
(0.418)
0.691
(0.989)
-2.526***
(0.448)
-1.904***
(0.310)
2.388***
(0.385)
judge_age 0.00324
(0.0119)
-0.0436
(0.0356)
-0.183**
(0.0758)
0.0336
(0.0316)
0.0204
(0.0198)
0.0111
(0.0280)
judge_tenure -0.0123
(0.0111)
0.0319
(0.0340)
0.205**
(0.0872)
-0.0470
(0.0433)
-0.00838
(0.0236)
-0.0640**
(0.0298)
judge_gender -0.0510
(0.233)
-0.154
(0.458)
1.249
(1.116)
0.341
(0.439)
-0.291
(0.353)
-0.613
(0.413)
judge_of_color † 0.0553
(0.201)
0.181
(0.477)
-0.735
(1.137)
0.192
(0.601)
0.215
(0.409)
-0.845*
(0.452)
panel_republicans
_fraction
0.0479
(0.244)
0.559
(0.618)
-0.239
(1.965)
-0.477
(0.707)
-1.007**
(0.463)
1.530**
(0.611)
procedure_score -0.141***
(0.0483)
-0.0677
(0.424)
-1.321**
(0.663)
0.0550
(0.0985)
0.0182
(0.0622)
-0.271**
(0.128)
subset_score_ave 0.105
(0.107)
0.0820
(0.189)
1.109
(0.882)
0.574**
(0.237)
0.832***
(0.145)
-1.270***
(0.398)
sct_case_score_ave 0.974*
(0.572)
2.450***
(0.737)
8.899***
(3.329)
3.035
(1.863)
-1.086**
(0.508)
5.888**
(2.920)
circuit_affirmance
_score
1.246***
(0.340)
-0.566
(3.577)
-19.84
(12.12)
0.852
(0.809)
2.259***
(0.505)
2.715***
(0.774)
case_criminal -1.534
(1.068)
-15.03***
(3.155)
– – -2.632**
(1.119)
–
lawchallenged
_level
0.0741
(0.152)
-2.108***
(0.734)
-5.035**
(2.454)
-16.26***
(1.672)
0.322
(0.251)
-0.219
(0.228)
lawchallenged
_source
0.0213
(0.166)
0.0363
(0.388)
5.722***
(1.370)
-1.401
(1.055)
0.0154
(0.178)
0.0763
(0.252)
claimant_plaintiff 0.718**
(0.342)
-10.62***
(1.021)
– – -0.775
(1.045)
0.00574
(0.935)
claimant_prose -0.981
(0.767)
– – – -0.641
(0.747)
-0.623
(1.321)
claimant
_individual
0.156
(0.223)
– – -0.0639
(0.736)
0.572
(0.592)
-1.805***
(0.578)
claimant_business
_small
-0.0693
(0.214)
3.251***
(1.052)
7.203***
(2.368)
-1.360*
(0.758)
-0.426
(0.870)
0.720
(0.846)
claimant_business
_big
0.544*
(0.299)
– – – – –
claimant_interest
group
0.293
(0.265)
-0.510
(1.009)
-0.442
(2.126)
-1.502*
(0.791)
0.0301
(0.223)
0.287
(0.541)
claimant_other 0.382
(0.715)
–
(0.679)
– – -1.097
(1.033)
-0.546
(0.598)
Constant -2.985***
(1.048)
15.90***
(3.763)
13.15
(10.51)
36.70***
(5.286)
-3.595
(2.235)
0.271
(2.276)
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Independent
Variables
Commercial
Speech
Gun
Rights
Gun Rights—
Civil
Abortion
Rights
Establishment
Clause
Anti-Affirmative
Action
Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1
Circuit fixed
effects
     
Errors clustered at
judge-level
     
Observations 757 407 104 247 481 309
Pseudo R2 0.102 0.279 0.513 0.298 0.291 0.306
Chi-squared 102.7 1089 46.64 321.7 139.5 100.6
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
“–” indicates dropped variables.
“” indicates the highest pseudo R2 value among the three models within a case set or case subset.
† In these models, judge race is operationalized as a dichotomous variable, either a person of color (1)
or white (0), relying on coding by the Federal Judicial Center.
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Table B.2: (Binomial Logit Estimates): Kitchen-Sink Models—Vote for Claim
in Whole or in Part—Judicial Common Space Scores
Independent
Variables
Commercial
Speech
Gun
Rights
Gun Rights—
Civil
Abortion
Rights
Establishment
Clause
Anti-Affirmative
Action
Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2
judge_JCS -0.156
(0.263)
0.554
(0.547)
-0.223
(1.515)
-3.803***
(0.676)
-2.765***
(0.487)
3.561***
(0.587)
judge_age 0.00328
(0.0120)
-0.0425
(0.0352)
-0.202***
(0.0782)
0.0371
(0.0328)
0.0313
(0.0197)
0.0000238
(0.0264)
judge_tenure -0.0120
(0.0111)
0.0331
(0.0345)
0.224***
(0.0855)
-0.0604
(0.0405)
-0.0268
(0.0245)
-0.0413
(0.0282)
judge_gender -0.0416
(0.234)
-0.164
(0.451)
1.439
(1.077)
0.217
(0.432)
-0.268
(0.353)
-0.884**
(0.410)
judge_of_color † 0.0454
(0.198)
0.0937
(0.441)
-1.038
(1.082)
0.357
(0.608)
0.279
(0.389)
-1.074**
(0.480)
panel_republicans
_fraction
0.0352
(0.244)
0.468
(0.622)
-1.333
(1.876)
-0.331
(0.784)
-1.100**
(0.470)
1.603**
(0.627)
procedure_score -0.140***
(0.0483)
-0.0546
(0.421)
-1.148*
(0.611)
0.0243
(0.101)
0.0247
(0.0621)
-0.296**
(0.121)
subset_score_ave 0.105
(0.107)
0.0841
(0.189)
1.106
(0.983)
0.543**
(0.247)
0.848***
(0.143)
-1.421***
(0.407)
sct_case_score_ave 0.974*
(0.572)
2.462***
(0.734)
9.427***
(3.478)
3.358*
(1.862)
-1.010*
(0.516)
5.090*
(2.811)
circuit_affirmance
_score
1.235***
(0.338)
-0.748
(3.573)
-21.10
(13.16)
0.989
(0.866)
2.232***
(0.517)
2.944***
(0.810)
case_criminal -1.531
(1.071)
-16.57***
(3.166)
– – -2.737**
(1.100)
–
lawchallenged
_level
0.0766
(0.152)
-2.096***
(0.727)
-4.991*
(2.775)
-15.99***
(1.587)
0.345
(0.256)
-0.309
(0.240)
lawchallenged
_source
0.0310
(0.166)
0.0258
(0.390)
5.780***
(1.388)
-1.079
(1.104)
0.0368
(0.176)
0.288
(0.250)
claimant_plaintiff 0.720**
(0.343)
-12.23***
(1.050)
– – -0.974
(0.974)
0.462
(0.894)
claimant_prose -0.980
(0.763)
– – – -0.623
(0.758)
-0.433
(1.378)
claimant _
individual
0.147
(0.222)
– – -0.356
(0.767)
0.613
(0.576)
-1.879***
(0.594)
claimant_business
_small
-0.0683
(0.213)
3.221***
(1.045)
6.872***
(2.486)
-1.519*
(0.785)
-0.247
(0.863)
0.946
(0.854)
claimant_business
_big
0.541*
(0.298)
– – – – –
claimant_interest
group
0.302
(0.265)
-0.494
(1.013)
-0.0795
(2.269)
-1.670**
(0.804)
0.103
(0.224)
0.303
(0.552)
claimant_other 0.375
(0.716)
– – – -1.087
(0.988)
-0.556
(0.594)
Constant -3.073***
(1.036)
17.68***
(3.830)
14.75
(12.46)
35.01***
(5.218)
-4.753**
(2.184)
1.911
(2.247)
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Independent
Variables
Commercial
Speech
Gun
Rights
Gun Rights—
Civil
Abortion
Rights
Establishment
Clause
Anti-Affirmative
Action
Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2
Circuit fixed 
effects
     
Errors clustered at
judge-level
     
Observations 755 406 104 245 471 306
Pseudo R2 0.102 0.276 0.511 0.296 0.287 0.296
Chi-squared 102.2 911.6 46.07 391.3 132.6 105.3
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
“–” indicates dropped variables.
“” indicates the highest pseudo R2 value among the three models within a case set or case subset.
† In these models, judge race is operationalized as a dichotomous variable, either a person of color (1)
or white (0), relying on coding by the Federal Judicial Center.
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Table B.3 (Binomial Logit Estimates): Kitchen-Sink Models—Vote for Claim
in Whole or in Part—Judge DIME Scores Including Imputed Values
Independent
Variables
Commercial
Speech
Gun
Rights
Gun Rights—
Civil
Abortion
Rights
Establishment
Clause
Anti-Affirmative
Action
Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3
judge_DIME
_imputed
0.0900
(0.133)
0.249
(0.243)
-0.188
(0.657)
-1.353***
(0.273)
-1.504***
(0.244)
1.867***
(0.287)
judge_age 0.00440
(0.0126)
-0.0418
(0.0355)
-0.207**
(0.0834)
0.0363
(0.0293)
0.0260
(0.0220)
0.00116
(0.0294)
judge_tenure -0.00948
(0.0123)
0.0330
(0.0349)
0.232**
(0.0943)
-0.0570
(0.0412)
-0.0297
(0.0260)
-0.0444
(0.0300)
judge_gender 0.00741
(0.232)
-0.161
(0.453)
1.550
(1.196)
-0.0119
(0.431)
-0.525
(0.380)
-0.433
(0.400)
judge_of_color † 0.154
(0.206)
0.211
(0.491)
-1.219
(1.362)
0.309
(0.598)
-0.215
(0.397)
-0.463
(0.524)
panel_republicans
_fraction
0.0969
(0.245)
0.505
(0.619)
-1.528
(1.946)
-0.0612
(0.731)
-0.943**
(0.478)
1.316**
(0.635)
procedure_score -0.147***
(0.0488)
-0.0749
(0.421)
-1.123*
(0.602)
0.00752
(0.0909)
0.0147
(0.0622)
-0.247*
(0.134)
subset_score_ave 0.0965
(0.109)
0.0807
(0.189)
1.106
(0.987)
0.533**
(0.235)
0.778***
(0.150)
-1.432***
(0.414)
sct_case_score_ave 0.806
(0.573)
2.471***
(0.734)
9.511***
(3.468)
2.099
(1.733)
-0.936*
(0.495)
6.418**
(2.524)
circuit_affirmance
_score
1.254***
(0.348)
-0.812
(3.548)
-21.14
(13.22)
0.917
(0.841)
2.355***
(0.516)
2.595***
(0.832)
case_criminal -1.592
(1.071)
-15.41***
(3.139)
– – -2.253**
(1.098)
–
lawchallenged
_level
0.0968
(0.155)
-2.108***
(0.733)
-4.994*
(2.798)
-16.30***
(1.440)
0.340
(0.277)
-0.294
(0.220)
lawchallenged
_source
-0.0200
(0.167)
0.0329
(0.389)
5.847***
(1.461)
-1.182
(0.997)
0.0550
(0.176)
0.0610
(0.245)
claimant_plaintiff 0.722**
(0.337)
-10.96***
(1.001)
– – -0.529
(1.103)
0.0171
(0.985)
claimant_prose -0.963
(0.800)
– – – -0.772
(0.744)
-0.910
(1.112)
claimant
_individual
0.178
(0.223)
– – 0.0472
(0.694)
0.372
(0.552)
-1.952***
(0.639)
claimant_business
_small
-0.0170
(0.213)
3.218***
(1.046)
6.916***
(2.675)
-1.080
(0.707)
-0.570
(0.912)
0.853
(0.869)
claimant_business
_big
0.559*
(0.298)
– – – – –
claimant_interest
group
0.332
(0.266)
-0.541
(1.008)
0.0186
(2.208)
-1.196
(0.753)
0.0558
(0.214)
0.383
(0.584)
claimant_other 0.382
(0.714)
– – – -1.079
(1.036)
-0.685
(0.609)
Constant -3.345***
(1.048)
16.46***
(3.843)
14.81
(12.37)
35.09***
(4.799)
-4.877**
(2.099)
2.953
(2.352)
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Independent
Variables
Commercial
Speech
Gun
Rights
Gun Rights—
Civil
Abortion
Rights
Establishment
Clause
Anti-Affirmative
Action
Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3
Circuit fixed 
effects
     
Errors clustered at
judge-level
     
Observations 745 407 104 246 478 307
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.277 0.511 – 0.298 0.326
Chi-squared 107 1180 46.86 – 144.7 102.4
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
“–” indicates dropped variables.
“” indicates the highest pseudo R2 value among the three models within a case set or case subset.
† In these models, judge race is operationalized as a dichotomous variable, either a person of color (1)
or white (0), relying on coding by the Federal Judicial Center.
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Table B.4 (Binomial Logit Estimates): Kitchen-Sink Models—Three-Judge
Panels Only—Party of the Appointing President
Independent
Variables
Commercial
Speech
Gun
Rights
Gun Rights—
Civil
Abortion
Rights
Establishment
Clause
Anti-Affirmative
Action
Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1
judge_party -0.0565
(0.185)
0.567
(0.459)
3.204
(2.645)
-1.855***
(0.462)
-1.730***
(0.341)
2.036***
(0.455)
judge_age -0.00453
(0.0152)
-0.0606
(0.0415)
-0.332***
(0.104)
0.0157
(0.0363)
-0.00522
(0.0250)
0.0132
(0.0354)
judge_tenure -0.00715
(0.0165)
0.0415
(0.0418)
0.337***
(0.109)
-0.0413
(0.0494)
-0.00905
(0.0290)
-0.0679*
(0.0379)
judge_gender -0.309
(0.266)
-0.252
(0.492)
2.588*
(1.465)
0.206
(0.491)
-0.754*
(0.425)
-0.360
(0.505)
judge_of_color † 0.0174
(0.228)
0.123
(0.511)
-3.275
(2.205)
0.684
(0.796)
0.236
(0.480)
-0.563
(0.538)
panel_republicans
_fraction
0.227
(0.249)
0.670
(0.638)
5.114
(5.210)
-0.0141
(0.706)
-0.900**
(0.424)
1.704**
(0.663)
procedure_score -0.133***
(0.0491)
0.109
(0.346)
-0.0696
(0.909)
-0.00921
(0.123)
0.117*
(0.0695)
-0.273*
(0.146)
subset_score_ave 0.224*
(0.116)
0.175
(0.193)
1.244*
(0.683)
0.636***
(0.236)
0.750***
(0.139)
-1.507***
(0.512)
sct_case_score_ave 1.101*
(0.597)
3.222***
(0.773)
9.410**
(4.181)
2.487
(2.244)
-1.276**
(0.566)
1.261
(3.523)
circuit_affirmance
_score
0.981***
(0.359)
2.110
(2.111)
85.71*
(49.31)
0.897
(0.847)
2.459***
(0.518)
3.083***
(0.959)
case_criminal -1.333
(1.022)
-14.16***
(2.427)
– – -2.546**
(1.103)
–
lawchallenged
_level
-0.170
(0.161)
-2.071***
(0.732)
-4.049*
(2.403)
-15.99***
(1.710)
0.419
(0.260)
-0.273
(0.285)
lawchallenged
_source
-0.0472
(0.181)
-0.275
(0.371)
5.577**
(2.715)
-1.174
(1.025)
-0.0203
(0.161)
-0.0258
(0.268)
claimant_plaintiff 1.012***
(0.351)
-10.99***
(1.066)
– – -1.132
(1.060)
-0.173
(1.097)
claimant_prose -0.876
(0.764)
– – – -0.463
(0.794)
-0.534
(1.211)
claimant
_individual
0.184
(0.236)
– – -0.158
(0.671)
0.253
(0.625)
-1.685**
(0.712)
claimant_business
_small
0.412*
(0.234)
4.485***
(1.282)
23.82**
(11.31)
-1.475**
(0.659)
-0.0578
(0.864)
1.150
(0.983)
claimant_business
_big
0.890***
(0.297)
– – – – –
claimant_interest
group
0.0315
(0.283)
-0.534
(0.937)
0.482
(1.899)
-1.145
(0.716)
0.00433
(0.243)
1.622**
(0.818)
claimant_other -0.0611
(0.846)
– – – -1.345
(1.061)
-0.577
(0.729)
Constant -2.834**
(1.192)
16.06***
(3.094)
-14.73
(16.34)
36.06***
(5.523)
-1.453
(2.452)
0.891
(2.815)
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Independent
Variables
Commercial
Speech
Gun
Rights
Gun Rights—
Civil
Abortion
Rights
Establishment
Clause
Anti-Affirmative
Action
Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1
Circuit fixed
effects
     
Errors clustered at
judge-level
     
Observations 681 385 93 195 366 234
Pseudo R2 0.126 0.337 0.637 0.280 0.301 0.346
Chi-squared 134.2 1324 77.27 332.3 127.8 97.84
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
“–” indicates dropped variables.
“” indicates the highest (or tied for the highest) pseudo R2 value among the three models within a
case set or case subset.
† In these models, judge race is operationalized as a dichotomous variable, either a person of color (1)
or white (0), relying on coding by the Federal Judicial Center.
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3. Commercial Speech Subsets
Given the elusiveness of measures that predict judge votes in commercial speech
cases as a whole, one way forward is to examine smaller subsets of litigation. We
made the effort in three subfields with theoretical or evidentiary grounds for special
attention, understanding that further partitioning can be done. In fact, one message
from our work here is that the selection of litigation domains can influence the re-
sulting picture of judicial behavior.
a. Post-2000 Cases
The commercial speech case set has the longest timespan in our study, and there
is reason to think that the character of free speech litigation changed during this
period. Intriguingly, the regression results do change somewhat if we analyze cases
decided after the supposed “First Amendment era of good feelings.”185 Results are
reported in Table C.1.
In post-2000 commercial speech cases, our judge ideology variables are still not
quite statistically significant. But, among other differences, the Supreme Court case
score variable is statistically significant (p < 0.05) in two of three models in the
post-2000 cases and, as predicted, points in a positive direction. Circuit court judges
might have become more attentive to the Supreme Court’s recent messages about
commercial speech as the field became more divisive. In contrast, the circuit af-
firmance rate loses significance in the post-2000 cases, which might signify that
commercial speech appeals became less like garden variety appeals.
Most notable in the post-2000 results is the “big business” coefficient. It is now
statistically significant (p < 0.01) in all three kitchen-sink models. These commercial
speech claimants appear to have gained ground in recent years—perhaps because large
firms have become better resourced and savvy litigators, or more sympathetic and
reputable parties in the eyes of many judges, or targets of especially assertive and
novel regulatory efforts. Unfortunately, our simple big business variable cannot test
competing theories for why, say, the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company might
perform better than, say, the Poughkeepsie Supermarket Corporation.186 Further-
more, individual claimants also seem to have gained ground in the post-2000 case
set. In addition, as displayed in Table B.4, the big business variable is positive and
185 See supra text accompanying note 57 (quoting Burt Neuborne).
186 Compare Poughkeepsie Supermarket Corp. v. Dutchess Cty., 648 F. App’x 156, 158
(2d Cir. 2016) (summary order) (upholding a requirement that individual items sold at retail
have price stickers), with R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1208, 1221–22
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (invalidating graphic warnings for cigarette packages), overruled by Am.
Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22–23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (rejecting
an attempt to confine the Zauderer test to anti-deception programs).
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statistically significant (p < 0.01) in the full commercial speech case set when re-
stricted to three-judge panels only. Perhaps big business success is not, or not only,
a function of time.187
Moreover and to repeat, our big business variable was subjectively coded. Better
but less convenient measures of “bigness” might be obtained for many companies
in our case set for the relevant time frame. One might count the company’s number
of employees, market capitalization, or name recognition from crowdsourcing services
like Amazon’s MTurk.188 The best measures will depend on the hypotheses under
investigation, which should follow careful consideration of plausible reasons why
judges might treat larger or more recognizable firms differently from other litigants.
Finally, as with the models for the full commercial speech case set, the post-2000
models obviously do not explain all of the variation in judge voting behavior. The
pseudo R2 numbers are larger but remain below 0.20. The post-2000 results are
provocative, though, and further investigation seems warranted.
187 Another possibility is that the Sunstein group’s commercial speech data set, which we
used to identify judge votes before February 18, 2004, implicitly applied a different standard
from ours for including cases and that their standard was somehow related to the prospects
of big business.
188 Cf. Terence Dunworth & Joel Rogers, Corporations in Court: Big Business Litigation
in U.S. Federal Courts, 1971–1991, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 497, 500 (1996) (relying on
the so-called Fortune 500).
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Table C.1 (Binomial Logit Estimates): Commercial Speech Subsets—Post-2000
Cases Only
Commercial
Speech
Commercial
Speech
Commercial
Speech
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
judge_party -0.320
(0.233)
– –
judge_JCS – -0.491
(0.332)
–
judge_DIME_imputed – – -0.0490
(0.160)
judge_age -0.0175
(0.0173)
-0.0188
(0.0175)
-0.0158
(0.0178)
judge_tenure 0.0177
(0.0205)
0.0194
(0.0208)
0.0164
(0.0212)
judge_gender 0.142
(0.240)
0.155
(0.242)
0.174
(0.244)
judge_of_color † -0.0363
(0.240)
-0.0485
(0.238)
0.0440
(0.243)
panel_republicans_fraction -0.271
(0.386)
-0.300
(0.387)
-0.215
(0.385)
procedure_score -0.184***
(0.0671)
-0.181***
(0.0670)
-0.186***
(0.0666)
subset_score_ave -0.257*
(0.153)
-0.256*
(0.152)
-0.245
(0.153)
sct_case_score_ave 2.061*
(1.055)
2.103**
(1.051)
2.141**
(1.047)
circuit_affirmance_score 0.719
(0.556)
0.701
(0.555)
0.664
(0.555)
case_criminal -0.691
(1.390)
-0.700
(1.384)
-0.808
(1.384)
lawchallenged_level -0.0360
(0.246)
-0.0340
(0.245)
-0.0413
(0.244)
lawchallenged_source -0.114
(0.238)
-0.111
(0.237)
-0.0923
(0.236)
claimant_plaintiff 1.418***
(0.481)
1.417***
(0.480)
1.435***
(0.472)
claimant_prose -0.582
(1.160)
-0.591
(1.145)
-0.527
(1.144)
claimant_individual 0.932***
(0.358)
0.915**
(0.358)
0.898**
(0.354)
claimant_business_small 0.514
(0.331)
0.503
(0.328)
0.510
(0.329)
claimant_business_big 2.347***
(0.511)
2.342***
(0.510)
2.279***
(0.503)
claimant_interestgroup 1.064**
(0.453)
1.070**
(0.451)
1.068**
(0.451)
claimant_other – – –
Constant -1.807
(1.385)
-1.901
(1.376)
-2.173
(1.350)
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Commercial
Speech
Commercial
Speech
Commercial
Speech
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Circuit fixed effects   
Errors clustered at judge-level   
Observations 484 482 483
Pseudo R2 0.173 0.173 0.171
Chi-squared 115 117.6 119
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
“–” indicates dropped variables.
“” indicates the highest pseudo R2 value among the three models within a case set or case subset.
† In these models, judge race is operationalized as a dichotomous variable, either a person of color (1)
or white (0), relying on coding by the Federal Judicial Center.
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b. Disclosure Cases
The D.C. Circuit’s disagreements in disclosure cases helped make an otherwise
sleepy constitutional field worth examining more closely.189 Disputes over graphic
warnings for cigarette packages and country-of-origin food labeling prompted
dissents and en banc rehearings. Regardless of the Supreme Court’s permissive atti-
tude thirty years ago in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court
of Ohio,190 perhaps disclosure cases have become not only more difficult but also
ideologically riven in a recognizable way.
We do find indications, albeit somewhat nuanced, that commercial speech cases
involving disclosure trigger familiar ideological divisions among judges. Because
the number of observations falls fast when we isolate disclosure cases, we revert to
the simpler bare-bones specifications to reduce the number of variables on the right-
hand side of the regression equation.191 We then take advantage of our judge-vote
coding which cuts between support for a constitutional claim in whole, support in
part, and outright opposition. This allows us to detect moderate influences on judicial
voting behavior, in the sense of limited changes in receptiveness to particular claims.
As a result, we are no longer modeling judges’ voting decisions as a dichotomous
choice between rejecting a claim or voting for at least part of it, but as choice among
three possible options: (1) vote to reject the claim(s) outright, (2) vote for the claim(s)
in part, or (3) vote for the claim(s) in whole.
To explore the factors that may influence this kind of decision, we present estimates
from multinomial logistic regressions in Table C.2. To simplify the presentation of
these results, we present only the model where JCS scores were used for judge
ideology. We can see in Table C.2 that ideology is a statistically significant predic-
tor of judge voting behavior in these commercial speech subsets. Because, however,
interpreting the signs and magnitudes of multinomial logit estimates is not always
intuitive, we use these results to simulate and graph 1,000 mock judge-decisions for
each commercial speech subset. These simulations are presented in Figure 3.0 and
help us visualize patterns in the effects of ideology on judge voting behavior.
Each dot in Figure 3.0 represents the probability that a judge voted to reject the
claim, voted to support the claim in part, or voted to support the claim in whole. Each
dot therefore has three probabilities associated with it. A dot close to any of the three
vertices signifies that the judge had a high probability of voting for that particular
option over the other two. A dot near the center of the triangle signifies that the
judge had an equal or near-equal probability of voting for any of the three options.
189 See sources cited supra note 81 (collecting cases and divisions).
190 See 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (“[A]ppellant’s constitutionally protected interest in not
providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal.”).
191 We also omit circuit fixed effects to minimize the number of variables in our models,
although we continue to cluster errors at the judge level.
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Finally, a dot close to the line separating two specific vertices signifies that the
judge favored those two options equally or nearly equally over the third.
The probabilities used to graph each of the dots were calculated by holding all
control variables at their means and setting the judge JCS ideology variable at one
of two points. First, in the triangles on the left side (Figure 3.0a and Figure 3.0c) the
JCS variable is fixed at -0.2685, which marks the twenty-fifth percentile of values
on the JCS variable. Judges with this JCS score can be thought of as left-leaning judges.
Second, in the triangles on the right side of the page (Figure 3.0b and 3.0d), the JCS
variable is fixed at 0.3705, which marks the seventy-fifth percentile of values on the
JCS variable. Judges with this JCS score can be thought of as right-leaning judges.
We gain insight into how ideology affects judge voting behavior in disclosure
cases by comparing dot patterns in the triangles on the left with the triangles on the
right. Figure 3.0a shows, for instance, that left-leaning judges are more likely to vote
to reject claims, with some chance of support in part. Left-leaning judges are fur-
thermore unlikely to vote to support claims in whole. Figure 3.0b, on the other hand,
indicates that right-leaning judges tend to straddle outright rejection and full support
of claims.
Table C.2 provides numerical comparisons for the disclosure cases. If we look
at votes for claims in whole compared to rejecting claims outright when disclosure
is at issue in the case, we can see important differences in voting probabilities between
left-leaning and right-leaning appointees. Commercial speech cases involving dis-
closure regulations seem to push left-wing judges away from right-wing judges when
measured by the likelihood of outright opposing or outright supporting claims, though
not with respect to outright opposing or supporting claims in part.192 If instead we
compare support for claims in part to support for claims in full, higher JCS scores
are again significantly correlated with a higher likelihood of supporting claims in
full. In other words, left-wing judges seem more attracted to partial support of com-
mercial speech claims involving disclosure compared to full support, while right-
wing judges seem to move in the opposite direction.
c. Right-Wing Advertising
Of all the surface features of a case that might energize disagreement along
typical ideological lines, the content of advertisements is among the most straightfor-
ward theoretically. Often, it is true, the content of commercial advertising at stake in a
given case is not clear; restrictions on billboards do not necessarily suggest the mix
of advertising content that will be affected. But sometimes the complaining adver-
tiser’s content is plain for every judge to see and plainly targeted by the government
192 In the full commercial speech case set, we can see only a small difference, on the order of
6%, between Democratic and Republican appointees in their willingness to support claims
in part.
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regulation at issue. Perhaps the content of these advertisements will influence judg-
ments on constitutional claims, even if constitutional doctrine indicates otherwise.
Using the same modeling approach that we applied to disclosure cases, a some-
what different pattern emerges in the right-wing advertising cases. Figure 3.0c shows
our simulated left-leaning judge vote probabilities dispersing across the three options
with a pull toward support for claims only in part. Figure 3.0d shows, on the other
hand, our simulated right-leaning judge vote probabilities once again tending to
straddle outright rejection and outright support of claims. In this subset, as Table C.2
shows, higher JCS scores are significantly and negatively correlated with support for
a commercial speech claim in part compared to rejecting the claim outright. How-
ever, higher JCS scores are significantly and positively correlated with support for
commercial speech claims in full compared to support only in part. So when the ad-
vertising content seems right-wing, right-wing judges might be especially attracted to
either supporting the free-speech challenge in full or not at all, in contrast with left-
wing judges who might be amenable to support only in part.
Interestingly, for these right-wing advertisements, JCS scores are not signifi-
cantly correlated with the choice between outright rejecting the commercial speech
claim and supporting the claim in full. Confining the investigation to this binary
choice does not suggest ordinary ideological divisions on the bench, while allowing
for more subtle influences on voting behavior does indicate some such divisions.193
Finally, resorting to summary statistics for a moment, the raw numbers suggest
that Democratic appointees are moving more than Republican appointees when
advertising content shifts from left-wing to right-wing. Republican appointees fully
support commercial speech claims in both content categories at about the same rate,
although the raw numbers do indicate a somewhat greater chance of supporting
commercial speech claims in part when the advertising content is right-wing. In
contrast, the raw numbers show that Democratic appointees’ full support for com-
mercial speech claims drop about twenty percentage points when advertising content
is coded right-wing compared to left-wing, and yet their support for claims in part
surges upward over thirty percentage points. If we refused to separate votes in full
from votes in part, it would seem that Democratic appointees were more likely to
support right-wing advertising (at least in part) than Republican appointees.194
193 No similarly obvious pattern of subtly changing voting behavior in the left-wing ad-
vertising cases was apparent from the raw data, although Democratic and Republican
appointees might be behaving differently in that subset as well. In 111 observations in which
the advertising content was coded as left-wing, Democratic appointees were 12% more likely
than Republican appointees to support a commercial speech claim in full or in part; but
Democratic appointees were somewhat more likely to vote for a claim in whole and to vote
for a claim in part. We have not tested these differences for statistical significance, however.
194 Sticking with raw summary data, Democratic appointees do seem more willing to
support left-wing commercial advertising than their Republican-appointee counterparts—and
the gap between Democratic and Republican appointees is larger in the left-wing (12%) than
in the right-wing advertising subset (8%).
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Unfortunately, with a small number of observations, running complex statistical
models often is not possible. But for what it is worth, in the five full case sets tested
above, the statistical significance or lack thereof never changed for any of our three
judicial ideology variables when we shifted from bare-bones models to kitchen-sink
models.195 It is also true that the disclosure and advertising content variables are
crude. Cases were flagged as involving disclosure even when other kinds of com-
mercial speech claims were adjudicated in the same case. And, as made clear above,
the ideological valence of advertising content was assigned impressionistically. But
the coding is meant to be transparent and readers are encouraged to evaluate the as-
signments critically. Imprecision or other error in these codes, moreover, would tend
to yield an underestimation of the underlying influences.
195 Compare supra Tables A.1–A.3, with supra Tables B.1–B.3.
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Table C.2 (Multinomial Logit Estimates): Commercial Speech Subsets—
Disclosure and Right-Wing Advertising Content
Disclosure Cases Right-Wing Advertising Cases
Independent
Variables
reject claim
v. vote for
part
reject claim
v. vote for
claim
vote for part
v. vote for
claim
reject claim
v. vote for
part
reject claim
v. vote for
claim
vote for part
v. vote for
claim
judge_JCS 0.0619833
(0.6998093)
2.280419***
(0.7551817)
2.218435***
(0.8119254)
-1.766271**
(0.8824904)
0.4140778
(0.753547)
2.180349***
(0.9093465)
judge_age 0.032446
(0.0463728)
0.0510168
(0.041507)
0.0185708
(0.0543189)
-0.0035499
(0.0500726)
-0.0444559
(0.0408426)
-0.0409059
(0.0493196)
judge_tenure -0.0562696
(0.0492489)
-0.0280177
(0.0434961)
0.0282518
(0.0584968)
-0.0323078
(0.0573179)
-0.0074885
(0.0460093)
0.0248193
(0.05313)
judge_gender 0.5025137
(0.524145)
-0.4855718
(0.4788975)
-0.9880855
(0.6472993)
0.4812465
(0.6779163)
-0.1836083
(0.5197124)
-0.6648548
(0.7127022)
judge_of
_color †
-0.0649948
(0.5793305)
0.6374028
(0.6084179)
0.7023976
(0.7155535)
-0.4084274
(0.812014)
-1.094317
(0.6016539)
-0.6858896
(0.8598522)
Constant
-2.131927
(2.454385)
-3.732307
(2.273982)
-1.60038
(2.896617)
0.307063
(2.835899)
3.125861
(2.3163)
2.818798
(2.830734)
Circuit fixed
effects ††
– –
Errors
clustered at
judge-level
 
Observations 150 97
Pseudo R2 0.0758 0.083
Chi-squared 15.56 17.66
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
† In these models, judge race is operationalized as a dichotomous variable, either a person of color (1)
or white (0), relying on coding by the Federal Judicial Center.
†† In these models, circuit fixed effects were dropped to facilitate successful regression analysis with
a relatively small number of observations.
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Figure 3.0: Commercial Speech Subsets—Predicted Probabilities of a Vote to
Reject the Claim, Vote for the Claim in Part, and Vote for the Claim in Whole—
Judicial Common Space Scores
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IV. IMPLICATIONS AND RESPONSES
A. Ideology in Domains and Degrees
We have identified two subsets of commercial speech cases, involving manda-
tory disclosure and right-wing advertising content, in which our judicial ideology
proxies were statistically significant correlates with voting behavior. Under current
doctrine, disclosure mandates should be easier for regulators to defend than other
restrictions on advertiser choices, all else equal. However vague the disclosure
doctrine may be, it certainly does not indicate that judges with different ideological
perspectives should systematically vote differently. If our ideology proxies were
measuring ideology in the loose jurisprudential sense of judicial philosophy,196 we
would have less concern. But our ideology proxies are designed to track policy
disagreements outside the judiciary. Even more difficult to defend would be judge
votes that not only depend on the content of the advertising—after all, checking for
deceptive advertising requires judges to examine advertising content—but on how
different judges with different ideological perspectives react to advertising content
with a given ideological valence. Again, the operational conception of ideology here
is a one-dimensional policy disagreement in ordinary politics.
Two other considerations may moderate the concerns, however. First, the apparent
patterns of ordinary ideological division show up in only part of the commercial
speech docket in the federal appellate courts. We have a total of 759 judge votes in
the full commercial speech case set, as reported in Table 1.0. Of those votes, 151 in-
volve a disclosure issue (20%), ninety-eight involve advertising coded as right-wing
(13%)—and forty-seven of those votes (6%) overlap. Roughly speaking, then, this
area of potential concern reaches about one quarter of the commercial speech docket
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Furthermore, recall that part of the movement among
judges is between full and partial support for constitutional claims. To be sure, we
have not come close to investigating every plausible subset within the commercial
speech domain. Perhaps “commercial speech” is a poorly conceptualized segment
of the judicial docket, anyway. But relying on what we can see, based on the empirical
strategies that we have chosen, a significant but not overwhelmingly large fraction
of commercial speech litigation is dividing along conventional ideological lines.
Second, from a system-wide ex-ante perspective, the situation might be better
defended.197 Our court systems will always include judges with a mix of views,
knowledge, and skills. Many of those differences are not only unavoidable but valu-
able, if we think of courts as groups of decision-makers working on some difficult prob-
lems without totally clear solutions. If these judge mixtures are largely understood
196 See supra Section I.A.
197 See generally Samaha, supra note 91, at 6–7 (offering possible justifications for
random assignment of diverse sets of judges in ways that can be outcome determinative).
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by prospective litigants who are well-advised by attorneys, people can predict and
plan. This system-wide perspective might not be much comfort for the litigant,
whether regulator or advertiser, who loses before one panel of judges and who is
convinced that she would have prevailed before a different panel, or if the relevant
advertising content had a different ideological valence. Looking at judicial systems
ex ante and system wide, however, puts our results in an informed perspective.
B. Mindfulness and Rules
One potential response to our commercial speech results is for judges to recog-
nize these areas of apparent ideological influence and rethink how they process these
cases. Because the disclosure and advertising-content domains have not been studied
in this way until now, the dividing lines might not have been apparent to these
decision-makers. Being mindful of a cognitive pattern facilitates conscious efforts
at self-correction.
Then again, perhaps the specially charged character of these case subsets (and
others) has been readily apparent to judges and practitioners all along. Moreover,
consciously confronting influential components of decision-making is not always
a sure-fire strategy for minimizing those influences. It is even possible for judges to
begin overthinking the possibility of unjustifiable forms of ideological influence, and
then overreact in opposite directions—suddenly becoming too supportive of or re-
sistant to disclosure challenges, or too supportive of advertising content with which
the judge might otherwise be (un)comfortable. Without excessive defeatism on the
prospects for individualized efforts at conscientious judging, we can flag the difficulties.
Another potential response is rule-oriented. To the extent that ideological influences
are troubling, judges might shift commercial speech doctrine toward clearer rules and
away from flexible standards. This doctrinal reform, if implemented effectively at
all levels of the judiciary, could reduce the discretion of individual decision-makers
and consequently the influence of their ideologies on case outcomes.
Yet standards certainly are not always ideology instigating, at least in a measur-
able way. Both Central Hudson and Zauderer offered doctrinal standards,198 and yet
it is difficult to identify ideological influence under the former.199 Furthermore, judges
would have to decide which rules to adopt, and therefore which sacrifices must be
made under the crude analysis required by this sort of doctrine. In addition, a rule-
oriented strategy offers only some hope for stopping ideology from migrating to
other corners of the commercial speech-related docket. Recall the series of contested
boundary questions listed above: what counts as commercial speech,200 what counts
198 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
563–66 (1980).
199 See supra Sections III.B.1–B.2.
200 See supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text.
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as misleading,201 what counts as regulation of commercial conduct,202 and what
counts as flat-out regulation as opposed to permissibly conditional subsidies.203
Theoretically judges may produce rules for each of these controversies, but surely
there is room to disagree that the achievement of rule-saturated commercial speech
doctrine is both realistic and desirable in any sense.
C. The Exit Option
Another possible response is for judges to embrace defeat and exit the field.
Perhaps the forty-year experiment with constitutional-grade commercial-speech
litigation should come to an end. Perhaps the judiciary’s constitutional move into
the territory of commercial advertising will become reversible in good time, as was
the judiciary’s earlier position that commercial advertising would receive no consti-
tutional protection.204 Some scholars and judges and others might become comfort-
able with withdrawal in the absence of convincing evidence that this brand of litigation
has been net positive for society.
Indeed there are respectable arguments for judicial withdrawal, even if no ideo-
logical influence on case results can be demonstrated convincingly. One simple
objection rests on restricting the value of free speech to narrow versions of self-
definition and self-fulfillment,205 but that approach might not withstand people’s
lived experiences in a supposedly commercial sphere that is not so separate from
other parts of their lives. The live objections include the sense that much advertising
is not really informational,206 and perhaps more troubling doubts that much of the
audience is adequately in control of these interactions.207 The objections reach still
201 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text.
203 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
204 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
205 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 196 & n.* (1989)
(arguing that a well-conceived “liberty theory” of the First Amendment “requires a complete
denial” of constitutional protection for profit motivated commercial speech).
206 An early effort to describe the image-advertising phenomenon in the law literature is
C.C. Laura Lin, Corporate Image Advertising and the First Amendment, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
459, 461–67 (1988).
207 Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV.
1053, 1086 (2016) (explaining that, in the commercial speech domain, the government may
“recognize that people are often dependent, vulnerable, and not equally able to fend for
themselves”). Balkin does not argue for judicial exit but instead would limit judicial inter-
vention such that, for instance, “[t]he emotional and cultural content of commercial advertising,
powerful as it may be, is subject to government regulation only to the extent that it helps to
mislead, obfuscates facts, or manipulates consumers into believing and acting on falsehoods
and half-truths.” Id. at 1088.
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further, to complaints that judges have offered almost no originalist historical sup-
port for the doctrine, grounded in the world of 1791 or 1868, and that the judiciary’s
pro–advertisement intervention looks too much like Lochner v. New York.208 Perhaps
adequate responses can be formulated for all of that. Readers can make their own
judgments.
The case for judicial review remains especially shallow, however, when we start
thinking about the proper role for courts within the larger society. Some of the
sharpest objections to commercial speech litigation concentrate on comparative in-
stitutional competence and institutional design, and commercial speech enthusiasts
have done little work to blunt these objections. Institutional turns in legal scholarship
seem to have passed them by. Within the intellectual space of institutional analysis,
though, we are obliged to investigate the arguably special social dynamics associ-
ated with commercial advertising, along with the judiciary’s special and limited role
in the constitutional order. We have reason to think that many commercial advertis-
ers capture the social value of their speech in ways that other speakers do not—and
that many commercial advertisers are organized for success in politics in ways that
other communicators might not be.209
If commercial advertising is not much like an informational public good, and if
commercial advertisers already fare relatively well in politics, it becomes hard to
justify special favors from the courts. And it becomes even harder to defend judicial
review when such litigation essentially repeats policy disagreements that we already
have elsewhere, now translated into the uncompromising terms of constitutional
208 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (invalidating a maximum hour law for
bakers); see Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 602–03 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“At worst, [the Court] reawakens Lochner’s pre–New Deal threat of substituting judicial for
democratic decision-making where ordinary economic regulation is at issue.”); Thomas H.
Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the
First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1979) (arguing “the absence of any principled
distinction between commercial soliciting and other aspects of economic activity”); see also
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
393, 423–27 (2015) (depicting recent judicial resistance to disclosure mandates as part of a
larger libertarian project, and objecting to “a kind of constitutional war against a regulatory
tool that is modest, promising, and characteristic of a wide range of congressional programs”).
A modest version of this critique is that judges today are pressing too far beyond the
constitutional value of commercial advertising in helping listeners make informed decisions.
See Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F.
165, 169–71 (2015).
209 See Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First
Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 565 (1991) (“Commercial speech also closely resembles
a private good. Most of the benefit of product advertising is captured by the producer itself
in the form of increased sales.”). Links between commercial advertising and the development
of culture and identity, see supra note 41 and accompanying text, might be grounds for
updating the economic analysis of commercial speech doctrine.
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entitlement. Learning that part of the commercial speech docket is subject to con-
ventional ideological disagreement is one more reason for people to reconsider the
exit option.210
CONCLUSION
A broad review of the commercial speech field shows no significant sign of
garden-variety ideological rifts over case results, even though judicial philosophy
must play a role in upstream decisions about doctrinal architecture. Hence commer-
cial speech cases writ large look nothing like abortion, affirmative action, or estab-
lishment clause cases on this measure. This headline is not changed either by different
proxies for ideology or by the addition of a battery of independent variables, in-
cluding variables designed to reflect applicable procedural and substantive law.
Familiar ideological rifts do seem to emerge, however, once we concentrate our
attention on disclosure cases and advertisements with an apparent right-wing valence.
These divisions are not outcome-determinative by themselves; other considerations
obviously matter to judges, perhaps including the size of the business interest
affected. And the area covered by the ideologically divisive cases is a fraction of the
entire commercial speech docket. But now we have greater insight into the domain
and magnitude of ideological influence—upstream and downstream, loosely and
tightly conceptualized—in this and several other fields of modern constitutional
litigation. Enhancing the precision and theoretical grounding of empirical studies
should make our understanding of judicial behavior more realistic, and our efforts
at reform better targeted for the future.
210 In fact, a rising frequency and popularity of commercial speech objections to disclosure
and other requirements could be one cause of, and not a justification for, rising judicial
enthusiasm for the claims. The influence may run through the judicial appointments process
if not elsewhere, which probably would make judicial exit dependent on forces well beyond
judges’ capacity to reconsider constitutional doctrine.
